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OPTIMAL EVIDENCE ACCUMULATION ON SOCIAL NETWORKS
BHARGAV KARAMCHED∗, SIMON STOLARCZYK† , ZACHARY P. KILPATRICK‡ , AND KRESˇIMIR JOSIC´§
Abstract. To make decisions we are guided by the evidence we collect, as well as the opinions of friends and neighbors. How
do we integrate our private beliefs with information we obtain from our social network? To understand the strategies humans
use to do so, it is useful to compare them to observers that optimally integrate all evidence. Here we derive network models
of rational (Bayes optimal) agents who accumulate private measurements and observe decisions of their neighbors to make an
irreversible choice between two options. The resulting information exchange dynamics has interesting properties: When one
option is preferred, the absence of a decision can be increasingly informative over time. In recurrent networks an absence of a
decision can lead to a sequence of belief updates akin to those in the literature on common knowledge. Information obtained
from observing repeated non-decisions is independent of realization, unless the private information of agents is redundant. On
the other hand, in larger networks a single decision can trigger a cascade of agreements and disagreements that depend on
the private information agents have gathered. Our approach provides a bridge between social decision making models in the
economics literature, which largely ignore the temporal dynamics of decisions, and the single-observer evidence accumulator
models used widely in neuroscience and psychology.
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1. Introduction. Understanding how organisms use sensory and social information to make decisions
is of fundamental interest in biology, sociology, and economics [13,17,21]. Psychologists and neuroscientists
have developed a variety of experimental approaches to probe how humans and other animals make choices.
Particularly popular are variants of the two-alternative forced choice task (2AFC) where an observer is asked
to decide between two options based on information obtained from one or more noisy observations [7,25,48,
50]. The 2AFC task has motivated several mathematical models that successfully explain how humans use
sequentially-presented evidence to make decisions [9, 16,58].
Most evidence accumulation models take the form of drift-diffusion stochastic processes that describe
the information gathered by lone observers [7]. However, humans and many other animals do not live in
isolation and may consider their neighbors’ behavior as they make decisions. Animals watch each other as
they forage [30, 35]. Stock traders, while not privy to all of their competitor’s information, can still observe
each other’s decisions. To make the best choices many biological agents thus also take into account the
observed choices of others [38,43,46].
Here we address the question of how idealized agents in a social network should combine a sequence of
private measurements with observed decisions of other individuals to choose between two options. We refer
to the information an agent receives from its neighbors as social information, and information available only
to the agent as private information. As agents do not share their private information with others directly,
they only reveal their beliefs through their choices. These choices are based on private and social information,
and thus reveal something about the total evidence an agent has collected.
We assume that private measurements, and, as a consequence, observed choices can improve the odds
of making the right decision. However neither type of information affords certainty about which choice is
correct. We take a probabilistic (Bayesian) approach to describe the behavior of rational agents who make
immutable decisions once they have accrued sufficient evidence. Their choices thus provide information about
their beliefs at a single point in time.
There are two reasons for assuming that agents only share their decision: First, many organisms commu-
nicate their decisions, but not the evidence they used to reach them. For example, herding animals in motion
can only communicate their chosen direction of movement [14,41]. Foraging animals may communicate their
preferred feeding locations [20,51], but not the evidence or process they used to decide. Human traders can
see their competitor’s choice to buy or sell a stock, but may not have access to the evidence that lead to
these actions. Second, if agents communicate all information they gathered to their neighbors, the problem
is mathematically trivial as every agent obtains all evidence provided to the entire network.
The behavior and performance of rational agents in a social network can depend sensitively on how
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information is shared [1, 36]. In some cases rational agents perform better in isolation, on average, than as
part of a social network even when they use all available information to decide on the most likely of several
options. This can happen when social information from a small subset of agents dominates the decisions
of the collective, as in classical examples of herding behavior [5, 22]. On the other hand, if after a single
observation agents share their belief and continue to do so repeatedly in a recurrent network, then all agents
can asymptotically come to agree on the most probable choice given the totality of evidence obtained by the
network [2, 23, 24, 36]. In this case of asymptotic learning, all agents are eventually able to make use of all
the private information in the network by observing the preferences of their neighbors.
In contrast, the decisions of agents in our model are immutable. As a consequence, asymptotic learning
typically does not occur. We also show how a rational agent who only observes a portion of the network
needs to marginalize over the decisions of all unobserved agents to correctly integrate an observed decision.
Interestingly when decision thresholds are asymmetric, the absence of a decision provides deterministic
information until a decision is reached. In recurrent networks, observing the absence of a decision by an
agent who has observed their neighbor’s indecision can lead to additional social information. This can happen
whenever an agent fails to act after receiving new information. This is akin to situations addressed in the
literature on common knowledge [2, 23,34].
Our evidence accumulation model shows how to best combine streams of private, and social evidence
to make decisions. Such evidence accumulation models have been shown to provide excellent description
of decision making in various tasks, and there is evidence that they can explain the formation of social
decisions [30]. Thus, they may point to common mechanisms for human decision-making.
This manuscript is intended as a technical report, conveying detailed proofs of all the propositions we
introduce. An abridged version of this manuscript, with some technical details removed and more examples
motivating the work added, will be made available as a subsequent refereed publication.
2. Definitions and setup. 1 We consider a model of a social network in which all individuals, or
agents, are trying to decide between two options, or hypotheses. To make a choice, agents gather both
private (Priv) and social (Soc) information over time. We assume that private information comes from
a sequence of noisy observations (measurements). In addition we assume that agents also gather social
information by continuously observing each other’s decisions. For instance, while foraging, animals make
private observations, but also observe each other’s decisions [15, 35]; When deciding on whether or not to
purchase an item or which of two candidates to vote for, people will rely on their own research, but are also
influenced by the decisions of their friends and acquaintances [1], as well as opinions on social networking
sites [63]. In many of these situations agents do not share all information they gathered directly, but only
observe their neighbors’ choices, or the absence of such choices (e.g. not going out to the polls, or not
purchasing an item).
To model such situations, we consider a set of agents who accumulate evidence to decide between
two states, or hypotheses, H+ or H−. Each agent is rational (Bayesian): They compute and compare the
probability of each hypothesis, based on all evidence they have accrued. The agents make a decision once the
conditional probability of one of the states, given all the accumulated observations, crosses a predetermined
threshold [7,62]. For simplicity, we further assume that all agents in the network are identical, but we discuss
how this condition can be relaxed.
Evidence accumulation for a single agent. The problem of a single agent accumulating private
evidence to decide between two options has been thoroughly studied [7,25,47,48,58,59,62]. In the simplest
setting an agent makes a sequence of noisy observations, ξ1:t with ξi ∈ Ξ, i ∈ {1, . . . , t}, and Ξ ⊂ R finite. The
observations, ξi, are independent and identically distributed, conditioned on the true state H ∈ {H+, H−},
P (ξ1:t|H±) =
t∏
i=1
P (ξi|H±) =
t∏
i=1
f±(ξi),
where the probability of each measurement is given by the probability mass functions f±(ξ) := P (ξ|H±).
Observations, ξi, are drawn from the same set Ξ in either state H
±, and the two states are distinguished by
the differences in probabilities of making certain measurements.
1For the convenience of the reader a table of notation and symbols is available at https://github.com/Bargo727/
NetworkDecisions.git, along with the code used to generate all figures.
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To compute P (H±|ξ1:t) the agent uses Bayes’ Rule: For simplicity, we assume that the agent knows the
measurement distributions f±(ξ), uses a flat prior, P (H+) = P (H−) = 1/2. Thus, the log likelihood ratio
(LLR) of the two states at time t is
yt := log
(
P (H+|ξ1:t)
P (H−|ξ1:t)
)
=
t∑
s=1
log
(
P (ξs|H+)
P (ξs|H−)
)
= yt−1 + log
(
P (ξt|H+)
P (ξt|H−)
)
,(2.1)
where y0 = 0, since both states are equally likely a priori. We also refer to the LLR as the belief of the
agent.
An ideal agent continues making observations while θ− < yt < θ+, and makes a decision after acquiring
sufficient evidence, choosing H+ (H−) once yt ≥ θ+ (yt ≤ θ−). We assume θ− < 0 < θ+.
3. Multiple agents. In social networks not all agents will communicate with each other due to limi-
tations in bandwidth or physical distances [31, 42, 64]. To model such exchanges, we identify agents with a
set of vertices, V = {1, ..., N}, and communication between agents with a set of directed edges, E, between
these vertices [26]. Information flows along the direction of the arrow from one vertex to another (Fig. 1a),
so agents observe neighbors in the direction opposite to that of the arrows.
As in the case of a single observer, we assume that each agent, i, makes a sequence of noisy, identically-
distributed measurements, ξ
(i)
1:t, of the state, H = H
±, from a state–dependent distribution, f±(ξ
(i)
j ) =
P (ξ
(i)
j |H±). We assume that the observations are independent in time and between agents, conditioned
on the state, P (ξ
(i1)
1:t , . . . , ξ
(ik)
1:t |H) = Πkl=1Πtj=1P (ξ(il)j |H) for any sequence of measurements, ξ(i)1:t, and set of
agents, i1, . . . , ik, in the network. This conditional independence of incoming evidence significantly simplifies
calculations, but is unlikely to hold in practice. However, humans often treat redundant information as
uncorrelated, thus making the same independence assumption as we do in our model [18,32] (See Discussion).
In our model an agent gathers social evidence by observing whether its neighbors have made a decision,
and, once they have, what that decision is. Each agent thus gathers private and social evidence, and makes a
decision when its belief (LLR) about the two states crosses one of the thresholds, θ− < 0 < θ+. Importantly,
once an agent has made a decision, it cannot change it. The absence of a decision thus communicates that
an agent has not gathered sufficient evidence to make a choice, and hence that this agent’s belief (LLR) is
still in the interval (θ−, θ+).
For simplicity, we assume that the measurement distributions, f±, and thresholds, θ±, are identical
across agents. The theory is similar if agents have different, but known, measurement distributions. The
assumption that the distributions, f±(ξ), are discrete, simplifies some convergence arguments. However,
most evidence accumulation models take the form of continuous, drift-diffusion stochastic processes [7].
These models take the form of SDEs, and approximate the discrete model well when many observations
are required to reach a decision [59]. They have been remarkably successful in describing the responses of
humans and other animals under a variety of conditions [49]. In subsequent work, we will extend our analysis
to the case of continuous measurement distributions and time.
Evidence accumulation with two agents. To illustrate how an agent integrates private and social
information to reach a decision, we use the example network shown in Fig. 1a.
Let I
(i)
t be the total information available to agent i at time t. The information available to agent
1, I
(1)
t , consists only of private observations. However, agent 2 makes private observations, and obtains
social information from agent 1, both of which constitute I
(2)
t . Agents are able to use each others’ indecision
information because they know their measurements follow identical distributions. Agents base their decisions
on the computed LLR, or belief, y
(i)
t = log
[
P (H+|I(i)t )/P (H−|I(i)t )
]
. Agent i makes a choice at time T (i)
at which y
(i)
t crosses threshold θ+ or θ−.
Since I
(1)
t = ξ
(1)
1:t , the belief of agent 1 is described by Eq. (2.1). At each time t, agent 2 observes the
resulting decision state, d
(1)
t , of agent 1 (Fig. 1a), where
(3.1) d
(1)
t =

−1, y(1)t ≤ θ−,
0, y
(1)
t ∈ (θ−, θ+),
1, y
(1)
t ≥ θ+.
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Fig. 1. A pair of unidirectionally coupled agents deciding between the states H+ and H− on the basis of private and
social evidence. (a) Schematic of the information flow in the network. Agent 1 accumulates their own observations, ξ
(1)
1:t , which
result in a sequence of decision states, d
(1)
1:t , that is observed by agent 2. In addition, agent 2 gathers its own observations,
ξ
(2)
1:t , to make a decision. (b) Sample trajectories for the beliefs (LLRs) of the agents. Decisions are made when an agent’s
belief crosses a threshold, θ± = ±θ in this case. A decision of agent 1 leads to a jump in the belief of agent 2.
The decision state captures whether agent 1 made a decision by time t, and, if so, what that decision was.
Agent 2 also makes private observations, ξ
(2)
t ∈ Ξ. Assuming that the two agents make private observa-
tions synchronously, the information available to agent 2 at time t is I
(2)
t = (ξ
(2)
1:t , d
(1)
1:t−1): Decision d
(1)
t is thus
not known to agent 2 until time t + 1. The observed decision state of agent 1 and the private observation,
ξ
(2)
t , determine the belief of agent 2 at time t.
The following proposition shows that the belief of each agent is a sum of information from private
measurements, and observed decisions, as claimed in Eq. (3.3).
Proposition 3.1. Assume that in the network depicted in Fig. 1a, agent 1 makes a choice at time T (1).
If agent 2 has not yet made a decision, its belief is
(3.2) y(2)s =
{
Priv
(2)
1:s + Soc(d
(1)
s = 0), s < T (1)
Priv
(2)
1:s + Soc(d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1), s ≥ T (1).
Proof. The observations of agent 1 and agent 2 are independent when conditioned on the state H.
Thus P (ξ
(2)
1:s , d
(1)
1:s|H) = P (ξ(2)1:s |H)P (d(1)1:s|H). Hence, taking the logarithm of the ratio of P (ξ(2)1:s , d(1)1:s|H) gives
y
(2)
s = Priv
(2)
1:s + Soc(d
(1)
1:s). It remains to show that Soc(d
(1)
1:s) simplifies to the form given in Eq. (3.2).
Consider P (d
(1)
1 = i1, . . . , d
(1)
s = is|H) where i1, . . . , is ∈ {−1, 0, 1}. Before agent 1 makes a decision,
it communicates a decision state of 0, so if s < T (1): P (d
(1)
1 = 0, . . . , d
(1)
s = 0|H) = P (d(1)s = 0|H). This
equality holds because d
(1)
s = 0 implies that all previous decision states must also be 0.
Similarly, when agent 1 makes a decision at time T (1), we can write
P (d
(1)
1 = 0, . . . , d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1, . . . , d(1)s = 1|H) = P (d(1)T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H).
Again, this is because d
(1)
1 = 0, . . . , d
(1)
T (1)−2 = 0 is implied by d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0 and the values of the decision states
after time T (1), d
(1)
T (1)+1
= 1, . . . , d
(1)
s = 1 are implied by d
(1)
T (1)
= 1. Thus
Soc(d
(1)
1 = 0, . . . , d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1, . . . , d
(1)
t = 1) = Soc(d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1),
and we note that the evidence from the decision state depends on the value of the decision state and the
time when it was first non-zero, i.e., when agent 1 made a choice.
As shown in Proposition 3.1, assuming the agents’ observations are conditionally independent, a straight-
forward applications of Bayes’ Theorem shows that the belief of agent 2 is a sum of the LLR corresponding
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to private observations (Priv
(2)
1:t ) and the LLR corresponding to social information (Soc
(1)
t ):
y
(2)
t = log
P (H+|ξ(2)1:t , d(1)1:t−1)
P (H−|ξ(2)1:t , d(1)1:t−1)
=
t∑
l=1
log
P (ξ
(2)
l |H+)
P (ξ
(2)
l |H−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Priv
(2)
1:t
+ log
P (d
(1)
1:t−1|H+)
P (d
(1)
1:t−1|H−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Soc
(1)
t
= Priv
(2)
1:t + Soc
(1)
t .(3.3)
This last equality follows from our assumption that the observations are conditionally independent, as shown
in Proposition 3.1. The belief of agent 2 is thus a sum of the LLR corresponding to private observations
(Priv
(2)
1:t ) and the LLR corresponding to social information (Soc
(1)
t ). The only information about agent 1’s
decision that agent 2 can use at a time t > T (1) is that at t = T (1) agent 1’s decision state switched from
d(1) = 0 to d(1) = ±1. This information is fixed for any time t > T (1) because decisions are immutable.
Note that we have defined Soc
(1)
t to be the social information emanating from agent 1, as this simplifies
notation when social information is passed between multiple agents. The stochastic process Priv1:t is defined
in the same way for both agents, and is equivalent to that of a lone observer given in Eq. (2.1).
4. Social Information. We next ask how much evidence is provided by observing the decision state of
other agents in the directed network in Fig. 1a, and illustrate how non-decisions, d
(1)
t = 0, can be informative.
Decision Evidence As decisions are immutable, once an agent makes a choice, the social information
it provides to its neighbors is fixed. Consider the case in which agent 1 chooses H+ at time T (1), then the
belief of agent 2 at time t > T (1) is:
y
(2)
t = Priv
(2)
1:t + Soc
(1)
t = log
(
P (H+|ξ(1)1:t )
P (H−|ξ(1)1:t )
)
+ log
(
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H+)
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H−)
)
.
Intuitively, if, for instance, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1, then agent 2 knows that y
(1)
T (1)
≥ θ+. Agent 1 has reached its decision
based on private observations, and hence none of the social information obtained by agent 2 is redundant.
The belief of agent 1 at the time of the decision, T (1) could exceed threshold. The evidence it has obtained
may thus exceed θ+. However, this excess is small if the evidence obtained from each measurement is small.
The following proposition shows that, after observing a choice, agent 2 updates its belief by estimating
the amount of evidence gathered by agent 1, i.e. by an amount close to θ+ (Fig. 1b).
Proposition 4.1. If d
(1)
T (1)
= ±1, then
θ± ≤ ± log
[
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H+)
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H−)
]
< θ± + ±T (1) , where |±T (1) | ≤ sup
ξ∈Ξ±
T (1)
(
log
f+(ξ)
f−(ξ)
)
,
and Ξ±
T (1)
is the set of all observations ξ such that a sequence of observations, ξ1:T (1) , terminating in obser-
vation ξ = ξT (1) can trigger a decision in favor of H
± precisely at time T (1).
Proof. We prove the case dT (1) = +1 in detail. The dT (1) = −1 is analogous.
First, note that d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0 and d
(1)
T (1)
= 1 imply
∑T (1)
t=1 log
P (ξ
(1)
t |H+)
P (ξ
(1)
t |H−)
≥ θ+, so [7]
eθ+
T (1)∏
t=1
P (ξ
(1)
t |H−) ≤
T (1)∏
t=1
P (ξ
(1)
t |H+).(4.1)
We define the set of legal chains of beliefs as those that lead to a decision at time T (1), but not earlier:
C+(T (1)) = {ξ(1)1:T (1) | Priv
(1)
1:t ∈ (θ−, θ+), 1 ≤ t < T (1); Priv(1)1:T (1) ≥ θ+} and note that C+(T (1)) ⊆ ΞT
(1)
.
Thus, P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H+) = ∑C+(T (1)) f+(ξ(1)1:T (1)), where f+(ξ(1)1:T (1)) := ∏T (1)t=1 f+(ξ(1)t ), which we
can combine with the inequality (4.1) to yield
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H+) ≥ eθ+
∑
C+(T (1))
f−(ξ
(1)
1:T (1)
) = eθ+P (d
(1)
T (1)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (1)
= 1|H−),
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and log
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1
=0,d
(1)
T (1)
=1|H+)
P (d
(1)
T (1)−1
=0,d
(1)
T (1)
=1|H−) ≥ θ+. To obtain the upper bound, note for any ξ
(1)
1:T (1)
∈ C+(T (1)),
Priv
(1)
1:T (1)
= Priv
(1)
1:T (1)−1 + log
f+(ξT (1))
f−(ξT (1))
< θ+ + log
f+(ξ
(1)
T (1)
)
f−(ξ
(1)
T (1)
)
.
which implies
+
T (1)
≤ sup
ξ∈Ξ+
T (1)
(
log
f+(ξ)
f−(ξ)
)
, with Ξ+
T (1)
=
{
ξT (1) | ξ1:T (1) ∈ C+(T (1))
}
,
by positivity of log(f+(ξT (1))/f−(ξT (1))), since ξT (1) triggers a decision, and log
f+(ξ)
f−(ξ)
≤ supξ∈Ξ+
T (1)
(
log f+(ξ)f−(ξ)
)
for all ξ ∈ Ξ+
T (1)
. A similar argument can be used to derive bounds on Soc
(1)
T (1)
for d
(1)
T (1)
= −1.
Note that the agents’ evidence accumulation process will not change if thresholds for agent 1 are different
from the thresholds for agent 2. In particular, if agent 1’s thresholds are θ1± and agent 2’s are θ
2
±, then if
agent 2 observes a decision by agent 1, it will update its LLR by θ1± depending on which decision agent 1
has made.
Social information prior to a decision. To understand why the absence of a decision can provide
information, consider the case when θ+ 6= −θ−. As one of the thresholds is closer to naught, in general each
agent is more likely to choose one option over another by some time t. The absence of the more likely choice
therefore reveals to an observer that the agent has gathered evidence favoring the alternative.
We will show that the lack of a decision is informative only in such asymmetric cases below.
Definition 4.2. The measurement distributions P (ξ|H+) = f+(ξ) and P (ξ|H−) = f−(ξ) are symmetric
if there exists an involution Φ : Ξ→ Ξ with Φ(ξ) 6= Id(ξ) such that f+(ξ) = f−(Φ(ξ)) for every ξ ∈ Ξ. When
θ+ = −θ− we say that the thresholds are symmetric.
It is frequently assumed, and experiments are frequently designed, so that threshold and measurement
distributions are symmetric [52]. In much of decision-making literature, for example, it is assumed that
Ξ = −Ξ and Φ(ξ) = −ξ. However, there are a number of interesting consequences when introducing
asymmetries into the reward or measurement distributions [4], which suggest subjects adapt their priors
or decision thresholds [28]. In examples we will assume that agents use asymmetric decisions thresholds
(θ+ 6= −θ−) due to a known asymmetry in the 2AFC task. Note that if the two thresholds are different
then one of the agent more readily adopts one of the two options. When the measurement distributions
are asymmetric then the agent can more easily obtain information about one of the two options. In such
a situation, non-decision on the part of an agent will provide information to those agents observing it.
Observing that an agent has not made a choice by time t provides evidence in favor of the choice that
requires more time to make. We show this explicitly in the following.
We call the social information agent 2 gathers before observing a choice by agent 1, the non-decision
evidence. Using the decomposition in Eq. (3.3), we have
(4.2) Soc
(1)
t = log
P (d
(1)
t = 0|H+)
P (d
(1)
t = 0|H−)
,
before agent 1 makes a decision. Define the survival probabilities that the stochastically evolving belief
remains within (θ−, θ+) as
S±(t) = P (d
(1)
t = 0|H±) = P (y(1)s ∈ (θ−, θ+), 0 ≤ s ≤ t|H±).
Then the social information provided by the absence of the decision by time t is,
(4.3) Soc
(1)
t = log
S+(t)
S−(t)
.
Note that if, for example, S−(t) ≤ S+(t) for all t ≥ 0, then H− decisions more often occur sooner than H+
decisions, and log[S+(t)/S−(t)] ≥ 0. Thus, observing that an agent has not made a choice by time t provides
evidence in favor of the choice that requires more time to make.
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The next proposition says that the symmetry of the thresholds and evidence distributions implies the
absence of social information until a decision is made. This may be intuited in the following way: when
thresholds and measurement distributions are symmetric, at any given time t before an agent’s decision, it
is equally likely for that agent’s LLR to be near either threshold from an observer’s perspective. Hence,
non-decision on the agent’s part will not convey any additional information to the observer.
Proposition 4.3. If the measurement distributions and thresholds are symmetric then Soc
(1)
t = 0 when
d
(1)
t = 0.
Proof. Let S(1)(t) be the set of all observation sequences of agent 1, ξ(1)1:t , not leading to a decision. Then
for all 0 ≤ s ≤ t,
s∑
l=1
log
f+(ξ
(1)
l )
f−(ξ
(1)
l )
=
s∑
l=1
log
f−(Φ(ξ
(1)
l ))
f+(Φ−1(ξ
(1)
l ))
= −
s∑
l=1
log
f+(Φ
−1(ξ(1)l ))
f−(Φ(ξ
(1)
l ))
= −
s∑
l=1
log
f+(Φ(ξ
(1)
l ))
f−(Φ(ξ
(1)
l ))
.
Here we have used the symmetry of measurement distributions in the first equality. Since the thresholds,
and hence the interval (θ−, θ+), are symmetric about 0, it follows that
∑s
l=1 log
f+(ξ
(1)
l )
f−(ξ
(1)
l )
∈ (θ−, θ+), if and
only if
∑s
l=1 log
f+(Φ(ξ
(1)
l ))
f−(Φ(ξ
(1)
l ))
∈ (θ−, θ+). Therefore, ξ(1)1:t ∈ S(1)(t), if and only if Φ(ξ(1)1:t ) ∈ S(1)(t). Moreover,
S+(t) =
∫
S(1)(t)
f+(ξ
(1)
1:t )dξ
(1)
1:t =
∫
S(1)(t)
f−(Φ(ξ
(1)
1:t ))dξ
(1)
1:t =
∫
S(1)(t)
f−(ξ
(1)
1:t )dξ
(1)
1:t = S−(t),
and thus observing the absence of a decision of agent 1 is uninformative, as
Soc
(1)
t = log
P (d
(1)
t = 0|H+)
P (d
(1)
t = 0|H−)
= log
S+(t)
S−(t)
= 0.
We show below that when measurement distributions and thresholds are symmetric, non-decisions are
uninformative in any social network. This follows from a generalization of the proof of Proposition 4.3, in
which we consider the symmetry of the set of all private and social information combinations that do not
lead to a decision by an agent.
When thresholds and measurement distributions are not symmetric then typically S−(t) 6= S+(t) and
log [S+(t)/S−(t)] 6= 0. Thus, the absence of a decision of agent 1 can provide evidence for one of the choices.
Should a decision or the absence of a decision by an agent be interpreted in light of one’s own observations?
Or is the information gained from observing one’s neighbor’s decision independent of private measurements?
As shown in Proposition 3.1, the second option is correct, and social information is deterministic, which we
now highlight by providing a concrete example.
Example: Belief as a Biased Random Walk. In the following example we chose the measurement
distributions, f±(ξ), so that the belief increments due to private measurements satisfy log
f+(ξ)
f−(ξ)
∈ {+1, 0,−1}
with respective probabilities {p, s, q}. This ensures that a decision based solely on private evidence results
in a belief (LLR) exactly at threshold2. Beliefs then evolve as biased random walks on the integer lattice,
as demonstrated below.
Agent 2 makes private observations and observes the decisions of agent 1, which are made only using
private information. Agent 1 and 2’s beliefs are described by Eq. (2.1) and Eq. (3.3), respectively. Real-
izations of these processes are shown in Fig. 2. The social evidence obtained by agent 2 is independent of
the particular realization, until the decision of agent 1, whereas private information is realization-dependent.
When thresholds are small, an expression for social evidence can be obtained explicitly.
We can use a standard first-step analysis [57] to calculate non-decision social evidence for θ+ = 2
and θ− = −1. In this case we have four belief states, y(1)t ∈ {−1, 0, 1, 2}, where y(1)t = +2 = θ+
and y
(1)
t = −1 = θ− are absorbing boundaries. Let P l+(t) := P (y(1)t = l|H+). Then, for P+(t) :=
2In the remainder of this work we use the same measurement distributions in all examples. We always choose p, q, s so that
decisions based solely on private evidence result in a LLR exactly at threshold.
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Fig. 2. An example of the belief evolution in a two-agent, unidirectional network shown in Fig. 1. (a) The belief of
agent 1 is a random walk on the integers. For boundaries at θ− = −1 and θ+ = 2, initially two observations favoring
H+ are required for decision d
(1)
2 = 1. The belief of agent 2 is the sum of stochastically evolving private evidence, and
deterministic social evidence until observing a choice. If agent 2 observes agent 1 choosing H±, its belief jumps by θ±.
(b) The same processes with θ− = −2 and θ+ = 40. Code to produce all the figures in the manuscript is available at
https:// github.com/ Bargo727/ NetworkDecisions.git.
(P−1+ (t), P
0
+(t), P
1
+(t), P
2
+(t))
T , the probabilities are updated according to
P+(t+ 1) = M(p, q)P+(t), M(p, q) :=

1 q 0 0
0 s q 0
0 p s 0
0 0 p 1

with initial condition P 0+(0) = 1 and s = 1− p− q.
We solve explicitly for the evolution of the probability of the unabsorbed states v(t) = (P 0+(t), P
1
+(t))
T
using the eigenpairs of the submatrix:
v(t) =
λt+
2
(
1√
p/q
)
− λ
t
−
2
( −1√
p/q
)
,
where λ± := s±√pq. Thus for d(1)t = 0,
Soc
(2)
t = log
(λt+ + λ
−
2 ) +
√
p/q(λt+ − λt−)
(λt+ + λ
t−) +
√
q/p(λt+ − λt−)
= log
(1−√p/q) + (1 +√p/q)(λ+/λ−)t
(1−√q/p) + (1 +√q/p)(λ+/λ−)t .
and for s > 0,
lim
t→∞Soc
(2)
t = log
1 +
√
p/q
1 +
√
q/p
= log
√
p/q =
1
2
log
p
q
,
since |λ+| > |λ−|. For our choice of parameters,
√
p/q =
√
e so log e = 1 and limt→∞ Soc
(2)
t =
1
2 . Note,
p/q measures of the noisiness of the independent observations of the environment and is a proxy for the
signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). If p  q, then limt→∞ Soc(2)t is large. On the other hand, if observations are
extremely noisy, i.e. p ≈ q, then limt→∞ Soc(2)t ≈ 0.
Interestingly, in the limit where all observations are informative (s → 0), the social information will
alternate indefinitely between two values. In this case, λ+/λ− → −1, and we have
Soc
(2)
t = log
(1−√p/q) + (1 +√p/q)(−1)t
(1−√q/p) + (1 +√q/p)(−1)t =
{
0, t even,
log(p/q), t odd,
since the belief of agent 1 must be at lattice site 0 (1) after an even (odd) number of observations.
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Fig. 3. Statistics of decisions in a two-agent network with (coupled), and without (uncoupled) communication from agent
1 to 2. The lower threshold is fixed at θ− = −2 throughout. (a) The fraction of times both agents selected the correct choice
as a function of asymmetry in the system as measured by θ+/θ−. The dashed lines are asymptotic probabilities of the correct
choice in the limit θ+ → ∞ for uncoupled agents. (b) First passage time distributions for the LLR in the case θ+ = 40. (c)
Relative percent difference in decision times for agent 2 in coupled versus uncoupled trajectories as a function of asymmetry
in the system shown for different values of p.
These formulae reveal that social evidence is typically not accrued significantly beyond the first few
observations when decision thresholds are small. This is because social information is upper bounded by
1
2 log
p
q , which will only be large in cases that p/q is very large and decisions will almost always be rapid
(occurring after two or three timesteps). We show this for θ− = −1 and θ+ = 2 in Fig. 2a, with Soc(1)t → 1/2
as t→∞ for our choice of parameter values.
In general, social information, Soc
(1)
t , will converge in the direction of the larger threshold, in the absence
of a decision. Intuitively, when |θ+| > |θ−| then more observations and a longer time are required for an
agent’s belief to reach θ+, on average. In this case, observing that agent 1 has not chosen H
− after a small
initial period suggests that this agent has evidence favoring H+.
To illustrate the impact of asymmetry in the measurement distributions, we varied the probability, p,
of an observation favoring H+, while keeping the increments in the belief fixed. When agent 2 observes
the decisions of agent 1, the probability that both reach the correct decision is larger than when they both
gather information independently (See Fig. 3a). In particular, as p/q decreases so that private observations
provide less information, the impact of social information on accuracy is strengthened. With θ− small, little
evidence is needed for an agent to choose H−. However, as θ+ is increased, social information pulls the belief
of agent 2 in the direction of θ+ over time, but more evidence is required to reach the upper threshold θ+.
Social information also affects decision times, particularly in the case of strongly asymmetric thresholds
(Fig. 3b). An early peak in the distributions represents decisions corresponding to the smaller threshold, θ−,
while the latter peak corresponds to the opposite decision when the belief crosses θ+  −θ−. Furthermore, as
p/q increases, the difference in decision times between the agents decreases (See Fig. 3c), as social information
speeds up agent 2’s decisions more when private measurements are unreliable. Also, social information plays
a more significant role for thresholds θ± with stronger asymmetry.
Remark: The impact of social information in this example is small, unless the difference in thresholds is
very large. However, this impact can be magnified in larger networks: Consider a star network in which an
agent observes the decision of N > 1 other agents. If these are the only social interactions, the independence
of private measurements implies that social information obtained by the central agent is additive. Until a
decision is observed, this social information equals NSoc
(1)
t , where Soc
(1)
t is as defined in Eq. (4.3). Thus
the impact of non-decision information can be magnified in larger networks. However, as these cases are
computationally more difficult to deal with, we do not discuss them in detail here.
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Fig. 4. In a recurrent network of two agents the LLRs, y
(1)
t,n and y
(2)
t,n, of the two observers are updated recursively. Agents
update their belief after private observations, ξ
(i)
t , as well as observations of the subsequent series of decision states, d
(j)
t,n, of
their neighbor (j 6= i). After a finite number of steps, Nt, no further information can be obtained by observing each other’s
decision, and the two agents make their next private observation, ξ
(i)
t+1, synchronously. The process continues until one of the
agents makes a decision.
5. Two-agent recurrent network. We next assume that the two agents can observe, and react to,
each other’s choices. As in the previous section, we assume that at each time the agents synchronously make
independent, private observations, ξ
(i)
t ∈ Ξ, and update their beliefs. The agents then observe each other’s
decision state d
(j)
t (j 6= i), and use this social information to update their belief again. Knowing that a belief
has been updated, and observing the resulting decision state can provide new information about an agent’s
belief. Hence, social information can continue to be exchanged, even before the next private observation is
made (See Fig. 4 for illustration).
We describe several properties of this evidence exchange process: As in the case of a unidirectional
network, social information is additive. It evolves deterministically up to the time of a decision of the
observed agent. Once a decision is made, the social information that is communicated approximately equals
the belief threshold (θ+ or θ−) crossed by the LLR of the deciding agent. We also show that the exchange of
social information after an observation terminates in a finite number of steps either when indecisions provide
no further social information, or when one of the agents makes a choice.
Such information exchange has been discussed in the literature on common knowledge and rational
learning in social networks [34]. This body of work shows that rational agents that repeatedly announce their
preferred choice must eventually reach agreement [2,19,23,24,39]. Typically, it is assumed that information
is shared by announcing a preference that can be changed as more information is received. Our assumption
that decisions are immutable means that agreement is not guaranteed.
We show how social information is exchanged using induction. We describe the basic case following an
observation at t = 1 in some detail. Following exchanges are similar, as the belief is updated recursively.
Social information exchange after the first observation. After the first private observation,
ξ
(i)
1 ∈ Ξ, at t = 1, the beliefs of the agents are y(1)1,0, y(2)1,0, where y(i)1,0 = Priv(i)1 . Let
(5.1) Π =
{
log
P (ξ|H+)
P (ξ|H−) | ξ ∈ Ξ
}
be the set of all possible increments due to a private observation, so that Priv
(i)
j ∈ Π, i = 1, 2. As the set of
possible observations, Ξ, is finite, so is Π. We will describe how the two agents exchange social information
with their neighbor until observing a decision, or until no further information can be exchanged. The second
subscript, n in y
(j)
1,n, denotes the steps in this subprocess of social information exchange preceding a decision,
or next private measurement.
We again associate a belief, y
(i)
1,n, with a corresponding decision state, d
(i)
1,n, as in Eq. (3.1). If neither of
the first two private observations leads to a decision, then d
(i)
1,0 = 0, and y
(1)
1,0, y
(2)
1,0 ∈ Θ, where, Θ ≡ (θ−, θ+)
for i = 1, 2. Importantly, the fact that agent i observed that its counterpart did not decide means that they
know y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ, for i 6= j.
To update their belief, agents compare the probability of all available evidence under the two hypotheses,
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P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(j)
1,0|H+), and P (ξ(i)1 , d(j)1,0|H−). As d(j)1,0 is independent of ξ(i)1 for i 6= j, their updated beliefs are
y
(i)
1,1 = log
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(j)
1,0|H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(j)
1,0|H−)
= log
P (ξ
(i)
1 |H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1 |H−)
+ log
P (d
(j)
1,0 = 0|H+)
P (d
(j)
1,0 = 0|H−)
= y
(i)
1,0 + log
P (d
(j)
1,0 = 0|H+)
P (d
(j)
1,0 = 0|H−)
= Priv
(i)
1 + log
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ|H+)
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ|H−)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Soc1,1
= Priv
(i)
1 + Soc1,1.
We omit the superscripts on the social information, since Soc
(1)
1,1 = Soc
(2)
1,1. Non-decisions provide the same
social evidence to both agents because we assumed the agents are identical. Since the agents know the
measurement distributions, f±(ξ), the survival probabilities, P (y
(i)
1,0 ∈ Θ|H+), can be computed as in the
previous section. Depending on the thresholds and measurement distributions, Soc1,1 may be positive,
negative, or zero.
If y
(1)
1,1, y
(2)
1,1 ∈ Θ, no decision is made after the first exchange of social information, and d(i)1,1 = 0 for
i = 1, 2. In this case, agent i knows that y
(j)
1,1 ∈ Θ, for j 6= i, and so θ− < y(j)1,0 + Soc1,1 < θ+. Thus observing
d
(j)
1,1 = 0 informs agent i that y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ ∩ (Θ− Soc1,1) ≡ Θ1,1, for i 6= j. More precisely,
(5.2) P (d
(j)
1,1 = 0|d(i)1,0 = 0, H+) = P (y(j)1,0 ∈ Θ1,1|H+).
Any initial measurement ξ
(j)
1 that would lead to a belief y
(j)
1,0 /∈ Θ1,1 would have lead to a decision at
this point. This would end further evidence accumulation. Thus the other agent either observes a decision,
or knows that y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ1,1.
We will deal with the consequence of observing a decision subsequently, and first consider only obser-
vations that do not lead to a decision. For such observations, we can compute the probability of available
evidence under either hypothesis by noting that some sequences of decisions have zero probability:
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(i)
1,1 = 0, d
(j)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,1 = 0|H±) =
∑
D=0,1,−1
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(i)
1,1 = D, d
(j)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,1 = 0|H±)
= P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,1 = 0|H±) = P (ξ(i)1 , d(i)1,0 = 0, d(j)1,1 = 0|H±).
(5.3)
The second equality follows from the fact that an observation ξ
(i)
1 leads to Priv
(i)
1 ∈ Θ1,1, which is inconsistent
with d
(i)
1,1 = ±1. Therefore, P (ξ(i)1 , d(i)1,0 = 0, d(i)1,1 = ±1, d(i)1,0 = 0, d(j)1,1 = 0|H±) = 0. The last equality follows
from immutability of decisions.
We also observe that
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,1 = 0|H±) = P (ξ(i)1 , d(i)1,0 = 0|H±)P (d(j)1,1 = 0|ξ(i)1 , d(i)1,0 = 0, H±)
= P (ξ
(i)
1 |H±)P (d(j)1,1 = 0|d(i)1,0 = 0, H±),(5.4)
where we used P (d
(j)
1,1 = 0|ξ(i)1 , d(i)1,0 = 0, H±) = P (d(j)1,1 = 0|d(i)1,0 = 0, H±), as d(j)1,1 depends only on the
observed decision of agent i, and P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0|H+) = P (ξ(i)1 |H+), because d(i)1,0 = 0 is implied by ξ(i)1
generating Priv
(i)
1 ∈ Θ1,1.
Combining Eqs. (5.2) and (5.4) gives the updated beliefs,
y
(i)
1,2 = log
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(i)
1,1 = 0, d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,1 = 0|H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(i)
1,1 = 0, d
(i)
1,0 = 0, d
(j)
1,1 = 0|H−)
= Priv
(i)
1 + log
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ1,1|H+)
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ1,1|H−)
:= Priv
(i)
1 + Soc1,2.
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Again, if y
(i)
1,2 ∈ Θ, neither agent makes a decision, and both will observe d(i)1,2 = 0.
The same argument used to obtain Eq. (5.3) and Eq. (5.4) shows that for any l > 0,
P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,0 = 0, . . . d
(i)
1,l = 0, d
(j)
1,0 = 0, . . . d
(j)
1,l = 0|H±)
= P (ξ
(i)
1 , d
(i)
1,l−1 = 0, d
(j)
1,l = 0|H±) = P (ξ(i)1 |H+)P (d(j)1,l = 0|d(i)1,l−1 = 0, H+),
when ξ
(i)
1 generates Priv
(i)
1 ∈ Θ1,l−1, where Θ1,l−1 ≡
⋂l−1
n=0(Θ− Soc1,n). Thus if the l-th exchange of social
information results in no decision, each agent updates its belief recursively as
(5.5) y
(i)
1,l = Priv
(i)
1 + log
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ1,l−1|H+)
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ1,l−1|H−)
≡ Priv(i)1 + Soc1,l,
where Soc1,0 = 0.
This exchange of social information continues until one of the agents makes a choice, or when the absence
of a decision does not lead to new social information [24]. The second case occurs at a step, N1, at which
indecision provides no further information about the belief of either agent, so that
(5.6) Π ∩Θ1,N1 = Π ∩Θ1,N1+1,
where Π is defined in Eq. (5.1). In this case, Soc1,N1 = Soc1,N1+1, and, if neither agents decide, their beliefs
would not change at step N1 + 1. As both agents know that nothing new is to be learned from observing
their neighbor, they then make the next private observation.
We denote the total social information gained after the exchange is complete by Soc1, and the belief at
the end of this social information exchange by y
(i)
1 = y
(i)
1,N1
= Priv
(i)
1 + Soc1. If no decision is made at this
point, then agent j knows that y
(j)
1,0 = Priv
(i)
1 ∈
(⋂N1
n=0(Θ− Soc1,n)
)
≡ Θ1.
The process can be explained simply: The absence of a decision provides sequentially tighter bounds on
the neighbor’s belief. When the agents can conclude that these bounds do not change from one step to the
next, the absence of a decision provides no new information, the exchange of social information ends, and
both agents make the next private observation.
Importantly, this process is deterministic: Until a decision is made, the social information gathered on
each step is the same across realizations, i.e. independent of the private observations of the agent.
Social information exchange after an observation at time t > 1. The integration of private
information from each individual measurement, ξ
(i)
t , is again followed by an equilibration process. The two
agents observe each others’ decision states until nothing further can be learned. To describe this process, we
proceed inductively, and extend the definitions introduced in the previous section.
Let Priv
(i)
t = log
[
P (ξ
(i)
t |H+)/P (ξ(i)t |H−)
]
be the private information obtained from an observation
at time t. For the inductive step assume that each equilibration process after the observation at time t
ends either in a decision, or allows each agent i to conclude that the accumulated private evidence satisfies∑t
k=1 Priv
(j)
k ∈ Θt for some set Θt ⊂ Θ. Note that Θ1 was defined above, and we will define the other
sets in the sequence recursively. We have proved the base step above, since we have shown that following
equilibration after observation ξ
(i)
1 , either one of the agents makes a decision, or each agent i knows that the
private information of its counterpart satisfies Priv
(j)
1 ∈ Θ1 for j 6= i. We then define
Θ1:t =
{
Priv
(j)
1:t
∣∣∣ l∑
k=1
Priv
(j)
k ∈ Θl for all 1 ≤ l ≤ t
}
.
Thus, agent i 6= j knows that any sequence Priv(j)1:t that did not lead to a decision by agent j must lie in
Θ1:t, and this is the largest such set. Note that the condition in this definition is given in terms of a sum of
LLRs given by private information, so that Θ1:t is not the same as {Θ1, . . .Θt}.
To define the social information gathered during equilibration following the observation at time t, let
Θt,0 = Θt−1, Soct,0 = Soct−1, and set
(5.7) Soct,l := log
P (Priv
(i)
1:t−1 ∈ Θ1:t−1, and Priv(i)1:t ∈ Θt,l−1|H+)
P (Priv
(i)
1:t−1 ∈ Θ1:t−1, and Priv(i)1:t ∈ Θt,l−1|H−)
,
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for l ≥ 1, where Θt,l−1 ≡
⋂l−1
n=0(Θ− Soct,l−1).
Theorem 5.1. Assume that, in a recurrent network, two agents have made a sequence of private obser-
vations, ξ1:t, followed by l observations of the subsequent decision states of each other. If neither agent has
made a decision, then the belief of each is given by
(5.8) y
(i)
t,l =
t∑
k=1
Priv
(i)
k + Soct,l,
for 1 ≤ t, i = 1, 2. The exchange of social information terminates in a finite number of steps after an
observation, either when a decision is made, or after no further social information is available at some step
l = Nt. The private evidence in Eq. (5.8) is a random variable (depends on realization), while the social
evidence is independent of realization, and equal for both agents.
Proof. The proof is inductive, with the basic case proved in the previous section. The inductive step
follows similarly. By a slight abuse of notation, let d
(i)
1:t,1:l denote the sequence of decision states up to the
l-th step in the equilibration process. If no decision has been made at this step, we write d
(i)
t,l = 0. This
implies that no previous decision has been made, and we denote this by writing d
(i)
1:t,1:l = 0.
In the induction step, we assume that equilibration following private observation ξ
(i)
t terminates on step
Nt. Conditional independence of the observations implies that P (ξ
(i)
1:t+1, d
(i)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0, d
(j)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0|H±) =
P (ξ
(i)
t+1|H±)P (ξ(i)1:t, d(i)1:t,1:Nt = 0, d
(j)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0|H±), so that
y
(i)
t,0 = log
P (ξ
(i)
1:t+1, d
(i)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0, d
(j)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0|H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1:t+1, d
(i)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0, d
(j)
1:t,1:Nt
= 0|H−)
=
t+1∑
k=1
Priv
(i)
k + Soct+1,0,
where we used Soct+1,0 = Soct.
Suppose that no decision has been made in the following l ≥ 0 equilibration steps, so that d(i)1:t+1,1:l = 0
for i = 1, 2. For all sequences of measurements ξ
(i)
1:t+1 that are consistent with this absence of a decision, we
have
P (ξ
(i)
1:t+1, d
(i)
1:t+1,1:l = 0, d
(j)
1:t+1,1:l = 0|H±) = P (ξ(i)1:t+1, d(i)t+1,l−1 = 0, d(j)t+1,l = 0|H±)
by marginalizing over all intervening decisions, and the final decision of agent i, as in Eq. (5.3). As in
Eq. (5.4) we have
P (ξ
(i)
t+1, d
(i)
t+1,l−1 = 0, d
(j)
t+1,l = 0|H±) = P (ξ(i)1:t+1|H±)P (d(j)t+1,l = 0|d(i)t+1,l−1 = 0, H±),
and therefore,
y
(i)
t,l+1 = log
P (ξ
(i)
1:t+1|H+)P (d(j)t+1,l = 0|d(i)t+1,l−1 = 0, H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1:t+1|H−)P (d(j)t+1,l = 0|d(i)t+1,l−1 = 0, H−)
=
t+1∑
k=1
Priv
(i)
k + Soct+1,l+1,
where Soct+1,l+1 is defined in Eq. (5.7). This exchange of social information stops at step l = Nt+1 at which
point Π ∩ Θt+1,Nt = Π ∩ Θt,Nt+1, and neither agent learns anything further from the absence of a decision
by its counterpart.
Belief update after a decision. Previously we described social information exchange in the absence
of a decision. The following proposition shows what happens when the belief of one of the agents crosses a
threshold.
Proposition 5.2. Suppose that in a recurrent two-agent network, agent i makes a decision after a
private observation at time T (i), during the nth step of the subsequent social information exchange process,
d
(i)
T (i),n
= ±1. Then agent j 6= i, updates its belief as
y
(j)
T (i),n+1
= Priv
(j)
1:T (i)
+ SocT (i),n+1, with θ± ≤ ±SocT (i),n+1 < θ± + ±T (i),n if d
(i)
T (i),n
= ±1,
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where we can bound
±±
T (i),0
≤ sup
ξ∈Ξ±
T (1)
(
log
f+(ξ)
f−(ξ)
)
, and ± ±
T (i),n
≤ ±(SocT (i),n − SocT (i),n−1), n > 0,
and Ξ±
T (1)
is the set of all observations leading to a choice of H± at timestep (T (i), 0).
Proof. We use an argument similar to that in Proposition 4.1. First, consider the case in which n = 0,
so private observation ξ
(i)
T (i)
triggers the decision. If d
(i)
T (i),0
= +1, we know
y
(i)
T (i),0
= Priv
(i)
1:T (i)
+ Soc
(i)
T (i)−1 ≥ θ+,
and since Priv
(i)
1:T (i)−1 + Soc
(i)
T (i)−1 < θ+, then
y
(i)
T (i),0
= Priv
(i)
1:T (i)
+ Soc
(i)
T (i)−1 < θ+ + log
f+(ξ
(i)
T (i)
)
f−(ξ
(i)
T (i)
)
.
Marginalizing over all chains C+(T (i), 0) such that y(i)s,m ∈ Θ for all 0 < s < T (i), and corresponding
0 ≤ m ≤ Ns, preceding the decision d(i)T (i),0 = +1 at (T (i), 0), we thus find
θ+ ≤ log
P (d
(j)
T (i),0
= 0, d
(i)
T (i)−1,Nt−1) = 0, d
(i)
T (i),0
= 1|H+)
P (d
(j)
T (i),0
= 0, d
(i)
T (i)−1,N
T (i)−1)
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),0
= 1|H−)
< θ+ + 
+
T (i),0
,
where NT (i)−1 is the maximal substep in the social information exchange following the private observation
at timestep T (i) − 1. A similar argument shows that
θ− + −T (i),0 < log
P (d
(j)
T (i),0
= 0, d
(i)
T (i)−1,Nt−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),0
= −1|H+)
P (d
(j)
T (i),0
= 0, d
(i)
T (i)−1,N
T (i)−1
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),0
= −1|H−)
≤ θ−,
where
±±
T (i),0
≤ sup
ξ∈Ξ±
T (i)
(
log
f+(ξ)
f−(ξ)
)
, with Ξ±
T (1)
=
{
ξT (1) | ξ1:T (1) ∈ C±(T (1), 0)
}
.
On the other hand, suppose d
(i)
T (i),n
= +1, and 0 < n ≤ NT (i) so that the decision is reached during the
social information exchange following an observation. Then,
Priv
(i)
1:T (i)
+ Soc
(i)
T (i)−1,n−1 < θ+,
which implies
θ+ ≤ y(i)T (i),n = Priv
(i)
1:T (i)
+ Soc
(i)
T (i)−1,n−1 + (Soc
(i)
T (i),n
− Soc(i)
T (i),n−1) < θ+ + (Soc
(i)
T (i),n
− Soc(i)
T (i),n−1).
Marginalizing over all chains C+(T (i), n) such that y(i)s,m ∈ Θ for all 0 < s ≤ T (i), and corresponding
0 ≤ m ≤ Ns, preceding the decision at (T (i), n),
θ+ ≤ log
P (d
(j)
T (i),n
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= 1|H+)
P (d
(j)
T (i),n
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= 1|H−)
< θ+ + 
+
T (i),n
,
and similarly for C−(T (i), n), we have
θ− + −T (i),n < log
P (d
(j)
T (i),n
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= −1|H+)
P (d
(j)
T (i),n
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= −1|H−)
≤ θ−,
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Fig. 5. The belief (LLR) of agents 1 and 2 in a recurrent network with asymmetric thresholds when (a) the agents agree,
and (b) agents disagree on a final choice. Also shown are the intervals Θ1,Θ2, resulting from the equilibration following the
first two observations. Each agent knows that the LLR of its counterpart lies in this interval after equilibration ends. Although
the beliefs evolve stochastically, the sequence Θ1,Θ2 is fixed across realizations. Here, p = e/7, q = 1/7, and s is determined
from s = 1− p− q. Also, θ+ = 2 for (a)-(b) and θ+ = 20 for (c) - (d). θ− = −1 for (a)-(b) and θ− = −8 for (c)-(d). Inset:
Social information obtained from equilibration converges in seven steps at the indicated time.
where
±
T (i),n
Q (Soc(i)
T (i),n
− Soc(i)
T (i),n−1).
Following the arguments in Theorem 5.1, we note then that
y
(j)
T (i),n+1
= log
P (ξ
(j)
1:T (i)
, d
(j)
1:T (i),0:n
= 0, d
(i)
1:T (i),0:n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= ±1|H+)
P (ξ
(j)
1:T (i)
, d
(j)
1:T (i),0:n
= 0, d
(i)
1:T (i),0:n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= ±1|H−)
= log
P (ξ
(j)
1:T (i)
|H+)
P (ξ
(j)
1:T (i)
|H−)
+ log
P (d
(j)
T (i),n
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= −1|H+)
P (d
(j)
T (i),n
= 0, d
(i)
T (i),n−1 = 0, d
(i)
T (i),n
= −1|H−)
= Priv
(j)
1:T (i)
+ Soc
(j)
T (i),n+1
.
As we discussed above, agent j may obtain social information before observing the decision of its coun-
terpart. However, this earlier social information is subsumed by the information obtained from observing a
decision. If the two agents have different decision thresholds, the expression for the post-decision belief is
more involved, but still computable. For simplicity we forgo further discussion of this case.
We next show this process simplifies when the thresholds and evidence distributions are symmetric.
Proposition 5.3. When the distributions f+ and f− are symmetric and the agents have the same
symmetric thresholds (±θ± = θ), then Soct = 0 until private evidence leads one of the agents to make a
decision. Thus there is no exchange of social information until one of the agents makes a decision.
Proof. The argument is similar to that used to prove Proposition 4.3. We can proceed inductively again:
If the two agents have not made a decision after the first observation, by symmetry this does not provide
any evidence for either hypothesis H = H±. Observing each other’s decisions after this first observation
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hence results in no new information,
Soc1,1 = log
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ|H+)
P (y
(j)
1,0 ∈ Θ|H−)
= 0.
Therefore, the update process terminates immediately, and both agents proceed to the next observation. As
shown in Proposition 4.3, further observations provide no new social information, unless a decision is made.
The two agents therefore continue to accumulate private information, until one of them makes a decision.
Fig. 5 provides examples of evidence accumulation in a two-agent recurrent network. In Fig. 5a,b, we
illustrate the process with relatively small thresholds and show how the intervals Θn shrink at the end of each
social evidence exchange (equilibration) following a private observation. Note that the sequence of intervals
is the same in both examples because the social information exchange process is deterministic. In this
example, equilibration occurs after two steps. In Fig. 5c,d, we provide an example with strongly asymmetric
decision thresholds. The equilibration of social information between private observations requires several
more steps, as shown in the inset of Fig. 5c. These examples also illustrate that the beliefs of the two agents
do not have to converge, and they do not need to agree on a choice, in contrast to classic studies of common
knowledge [2, 23,34].
6. Accumulation of Evidence on General Networks. In networks that are not fully connected,
rational agents need to take into account the impact of the decisions of agents that they do not observe
directly. To do so they marginalize over all unobserved decision states. This computation can be complex,
even when thresholds and evidence distributions are symmetric.
To illustrate we begin by describing the example of agents with symmetric decision thresholds and
measurement distributions on a directed chain. Symmetry makes the computations more transparent, as the
absence of a decision is not informative about the belief of any agent, hidden or visible. Social information
is therefore only communicated when an agent directly observes a choice. Such an observation leads to a
jump in the agent’s belief, and can initiate a cascade of decisions down the chain [10].
We note that once an agent in the network makes a decision, symmetry can be broken: Agents know
that all others who have observed the decision have evidence favoring the observed choice. As we have seen,
once symmetry is broken even the absence of a choice can provide social information. In this case rational
agents must equilibriate their beliefs using known survival probabilities, as discussed in the previous section.
We do not analyze this case.
6.1. Terminology and Notation. In a social network of N agents, we again assume that each agent
makes a private observation at every time step. After incorporating the evidence from this observation the
agent then updates its decision state and shares it with its neighbors. A directed edge from agent j to i,
denoted by j → i, means that agent j communicates its decision state to agent i. The set of neighbors that
agent i observes is denoted by N (i) = {j : j → i}.
Agent i thus receives social information from all agents in N (i). However, agent i also needs to take into
account decisions of unobserved agents. We define the set of all agents not visible to agent i as
U (i) = {j : j /∈ N (i), and j 6= i}.
Thus all agents in the network, besides agent i, belong to N (i) or U (i). Let W = {1, 2, 3, ..., N}. Then
W = N (i) ∪ U (i) ∪ {i} and N (i) ∩ U (i),N (i) ∩ {i},U (i) ∩ {i} all equal the empty set ∅.
We denote the set of decisions by the neighbors of agent i following the observation at time t by
dN
(i)
t = {d(k)t : k ∈ N (i)}. Similarly, the set of the decisions by unobserved agents is denoted by dU
(i)
t . More
generally, dN
(i)
1:t denotes the sequence of decision states of the neighbors of agent i up to and including the
decision following the observation at time t: dN
(i)
1:t = {dN
(i)
s : 1 ≤ s ≤ t}. We will see that in the case of
symmetric thresholds and observations no equilibration occurs, so these decision states describe information
available to each agent in the network completely until one of the agents makes a choice. At time t, the
private and social observations obtained by agent i are therefore I
(i)
t = {ξ(i)1:t, dN
(i)
1:t−1}. As before, we denote
the private information by Priv
(i)
1:t = log
(
P (ξ
(i)
1:t|H+)/P (ξ(i)1:t|H−)
)
.
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6.2. Non-decisions. We next show that in social networks of agents with symmetric thresholds and
measurement distributions, the agent’s beliefs have two properties that simplify computations: An absence
of a decision is uninformative, and once a decision is observed, the resulting social information is additive.
Proposition 6.1. Assume all agents have symmetric thresholds and evidence distributions. If neither
agent i, nor any of its neighbors in N (i) have made a decision by time t, then the belief of agent i is
y
(i)
t = log
P (I
(i)
t |H+)
P (I
(i)
t |H−)
= log
P (ξ
(i)
1:t, d
N (i)
1:t = 0|H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1:t, d
N (i)
1:t = 0|H−)
= Priv
(i)
1:t.
Thus social information is only obtained from observing a choice.
Proof. The claim follows from an argument similar to that given in Sections 4 and 5. The main difference
is that agent i here marginalizes over unobserved decision states.
By definition, the only direct social information agent i has is the set of decision states of its neighbors
dN
(i)
1:t = 0 to time t. First we can split the private evidence from the social evidence conditioned on the
agent’s observations,
y
(i)
t = log
P (I
(i)
t |H+)
P (I
(i)
t |H−)
= log
P (ξ
(i)
1:t, d
N (i)
1:t = 0|H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1:t, d
N (i)
1:t = 0|H−)
= log
P (ξ
(i)
1:t|H+)
P (ξ
(i)
1:t|H−)
+ log
P (dN
(i)
1:t = 0|ξ(i)1:t, H+)
P (dN (i)1:t = 0|ξ(i)1:t, H−)
.
Marginalizing over all possible combinations of decision states for unseen neighbors, dU
(i)
1:t , and observa-
tions of neighbors, ξN
(i)
1:t , we can show
(6.1) log
P (dN
(i)
1:t = 0|ξ(i)1:t, H+)
P (dN (i)1:t = 0|ξ(i)1:t, H−)
= log
∑
CN(i)t
P (dN
(i)
1:t = 0, ξ
N (i)
1:t , d
U(i)
1:t |ξ(i)1:t, H+)
∑
CN(i)t
P (dN
(i)
1:t = 0, ξ
N (i)
1:t , d
U(i)
1:t |ξ(i)1:t, H−)
= 0,
where CN (i)t denotes all possible chains (ξN
(i)
1:t , d
U(i)
1:t ) of social and private observations that neighbors of
agent i could have made without reaching a decision by time t. For a decision history of the unobserved
agents dU
(i)
1:t , let −dU
(i)
1:t , be the opposite decision history, flipping the sign of each decision in the vector d
U(i)
1:t ,
and leaving non-decisions unaffected. Likewise, for a private observation history, ξN
(i)
1:t , of the neighbors, let
−ξN (i)1:t be the opposite sequence of observations. Symmetry in thresholds and measurement distributions
implies P (y
(j)
t = z|H+) = P (y(j)t = −z|H−) for all z ∈ Ξ. By symmetry,
(6.2) P (dN
(i)
1:t = 0, ξ
N (i)
1:t , d
U(i)
1:t |ξ(i)1:t, H+) = P (dN
(i)
1:t = 0,−ξN
(i)
1:t ,−dU
(i)
1:t |ξ(i)1:t, H−).
Therefore in Eq. (6.1), for every chain (ξN
(i)
1:t , d
U(i)
1:t ) appearing in the numerator, its negation −(ξN
(i)
1:t , d
U(i)
1:t )
also appears in the denominator. The sums in the numerator and denominator on the right hand side of
Eq. (6.1) are equal, so the log of the ratio vanishes.
It remains to show that none of the agents engage in equilibration. Note that after its first private
measurement, no agent i obtains further information from a non-decision of its neighbors. The equilibration
process therefore does not start. The same holds after further private measurements by induction.
Thus, before decisions are made, agents independently accumulate evidence. Decision states are only
informative when an agent makes a choice. As in the case of two agents, a choice by any agent will lead to
a jump in the belief of all observing neighbors.
Remark: Suppose that two neighboring agents, j and k, both observe an agent making a choice. Agent k
now knows that the belief of agent j must have increased by a known amount due to the mutually observed
decision. Agent k thus gains knowledge about the belief of agent j, even if j does not immediately decide.
The symmetry is therefore broken, and henceforth the situation is similar to the asymmetric case discussed
in Section 5. This introduces additional drift, and potentially the need for equilibration, until agent k or j
make decisions. We thus concentrate on the dynamics up to the first decision, but discuss the general case
in more detail in some of our examples.
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Fig. 6. Agents on a line. Agent 3 observes the decisions of agent 2, but not of agent 1. However, agent 3 still needs to
take into account the possibility that a choice by agent 1 has caused a decision by agent 2.
6.3. Example of Marginalization: 3-Agents on a Line. We demonstrate the computations needed
to account for unobserved agents using the example shown in Fig. 6. In this case a decision by agent 3 is
not observed by any other agent. If agent 1 makes a decision first, then agent 2 continues to accumulate
information as in the case of two unidirectionally coupled agents discussed in Section 3. It is therefore
sufficient to only consider the case when agent 2 makes a decision first at time T (2).
As shown in Proposition 6.1, agent 3 has no social information before observing a decision by agent
2. After observing a decision by agent 2, agent 3 updates its belief by marginalizing over possible decision
histories of agent 1:
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= ±1|H±) = P (d(2)
T (2)
= ±1, d(1)
T (2)
= 0|H±) +
T (2)∑
s=1
∑
d=±1
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= ±1, d(1)s−1 = 0, d(1)s = d|H±).(6.3)
Intuitively, a choice of agent 2 can be triggered by either: (a) A private observation leading to the belief y
(2)
t
reaching one of the thresholds, θ±. This possibility is captured by all terms in Eq. (6.3) except
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= ±1, d(1)
T (2)−1 = 0, d
(1)
T (2)
= ±1|H±);(6.4)
or (b) The decision of agent 1 causing a jump in the belief y
(2)
t above threshold θ+ or below threshold θ−. This
second possibility is captured by the term in Eq. (6.4). An argument equivalent to that in Proposition 4.1
shows that the social information communicated in the first case is close to ±θ for d(2)
T (2)
= ±1. However,
in the second case the belief of agent 2 at the time of decision is in the range y
(2)
T (2)
∈ [θ, 2θ] for d(2)
T (2)
= +1
or y
(2)
T (2)
∈ [−2θ,−θ] for d(2)
T (2)
= −1, modulo a small correction. Agent 3 updates its belief by weighting
both possibilities, and hence increases its belief by an amount greater than θ. This depends mostly on the
thresholds θ, but less on the informativeness of individual observations.
To show this, we note that for any s = 1, ..., T (2) − 1,
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
s = ±1|H+)
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
s = ±1|H−)
≈ P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
s = 0|H+)
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
s = 0|H−)
≈ eθ,(6.5)
assuming f±(ξ) are close so Priv
(2)
t are small. This is a common approximation in the literature on sequential
probability ratio tests [61]. The situations where a decision from agent 1 does not immediately cause a
decision from agent 2, conditioned on H+, are described by
ζ+
T (2)
:=P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= 0|H+) +
T (2)∑
s=1
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d(1)s = −1, d(1)s−1 = 0|H+)
+
T (2)−1∑
s=1
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d(1)s = 1, d
(1)
s−1 = 0|H+).
Note, when agent 2 makes an H+ decision immediately after agent 1 makes an H− decision, (d(2)
T (2)
=
1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = −1, d
(1)
T (2)−2 = 0), it must have done so due to private information Priv
(2)
t arriving immediately
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before the social information Soc
(2)
T (2)
due to agent 1’s opposite decision, which would otherwise drive y
(2)
T (2)
far from the +θ threshold. Since we have assumed Priv
(2)
t are small, this situation is extremely unlikely, so
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= −1, d(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H+) ≈ 0. Using Eq. (6.5), we have
ζ+
T (2)
≈ eθ ·
P (d(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H−) +
T (2)∑
s=1
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d(1)s = −1, d(1)s−1 = 0|H−)
+
T (2)−1∑
s=1
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d(1)s = 1, d
(1)
s−1 = 0|H−)
 .
By Eq. (6.3), we have
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1|H+) = ζ+
T (2)
+ P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H+)
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1|H−) ≈ e−θζ+
T (2)
+ P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H−),
so that
(6.6) Soc
(3)
T (2)
≈ log
( P (d(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H+) + ζ
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H−) + ζe−θ
)
.
Note that
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H±) = P (y
(2)
T (2)
∈ [0, θ)|H±)P (d(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H±),
and
P (d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H+) ≈ eθP (d
(1)
T (2)
= 1, d
(1)
T (2)−1 = 0|H−) ≈
1
1 + e−θ
.
Let
(6.7) R+(t) := log
(P (y(2)t ∈ [0, θ)|H+)
P (y
(2)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H−)
)
≥ 0.
Note that we can increase R+(t) by increasing θ, without changing the measurements, or their distributions.
It follows that,
Soc
(3)
T (2)
≈ log
( P (y(2)
T (2)
∈ [0, θ)|H+)P (d(1)
T (2)−1 = 1|H+) + ζ+T (2)
P (y
(2)
T (2)
∈ [0, θ)|H+)P (d(1)
T (2)−1 = 1|H+)e−R+(T
(2)) + ζ+
T (2)
eθ
)
≈ log
( P (y(2)
T (2)
∈ [0, θ)|H+) + ζ+
T (2)
(1 + e−θ)
P (y
(2)
T (2)
∈ [0, θ)|H+)e−R+(T (2)) + ζ+
T (2)
(1 + e−θ)
)
+ θ ≥ θ.
We therefore see that increasing R+(T
(2)) increases the magnitude of social information received from ob-
serving a choice by agent 2.
The impact of a decision d
(2)
T (2)
= −1 can be computed in a similarly, yielding
Soc
(3)
T (2)
≈ log
(
P (y
(2)
T (2)
∈ (−θ, 0]|H+)e−|R−(T (2))| + ζ−
T (2)
(1 + e−θ)
P (y
(2)
T (2)
∈ (−θ, 0]|H+) + ζ−
T (2)
(1 + e−θ)
)
− θ ≤ θ,
where
ζ−
T (2)
:=P (d
(2)
T (2)
= −1, d(1)
T (2)
= 0|H−) +
T (2)−1∑
s=1
P (d
(2)
t = −1, d(1)s = −1, d(1)s−1 = 0|H−)
+
T (2)∑
s=1
P (d
(2)
T (2)
= −1, d(1)s = 1, d(1)s−1 = 0|H−),
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Fig. 7. The performance of the three agents on a directed line is better than that of independent agents. (a) The fraction
of trials for which all three agents make the correct choice. This quantity is larger when agents are allowed to exchange
information (coupled), than when agents make decisions independently (uncoupled). (b) Time required for all three agents to
make a decision. Average decision times are also smaller when agents exchange information. Here, |θ±| = 30, and ratio p/q
determines the noisiness of the measurements, as described in Section 4.
and
(6.8) R−(t) := log
(P (y(2)t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H+)
P (y
(2)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H−)
)
≤ 0.
In Fig. 7, we illustrate how including social information affects key metrics in decision-making: decision-
time and accuracy. When p/q is not too large, and hence the signal-to-noise ratio (SNR) of observations is
low, the exchange of social information impacts both the accuracy and response time of agents significantly.
Agents in a social network choose the correct decision more often compared to isolated agents, as the impact
of social information is significant. When p/q, and hence SNR, is large, including social information does
not benefit the agents strongly: accuracy and decision time of agents in a network are similar to isolated
agents. Private information dominates the decision making process in these cases.
Marginalization becomes more complex when the unseen component, U (i), of the network is larger. For
instance, if we consider a long, directed line of n agents, when the k-th agent makes a decision, the k+ 1-th
agent must marginalize over the preceding k − 1 agents. If the resulting jump in the belief, y(k+1)t , exceeds
2θ, this triggers an immediate decision in agent k+1, and all successive agents. This is equivalent to herding
behavior described in the economics literature [1, 5].
7. Three-Agent Cliques. In cliques, or all-to-all coupled networks, all agents can observe each others’
decisions, and U (i) = ∅ for all i. This simplifies the analysis, as no agent needs to marginalize over the decision
states of unobserved agents. We start by discussing the case of three-agent cliques in some detail, and proceed
to cliques of arbitrary size in the next section.
As we are assuming symmetry, social evidence is shared only after the first agent makes a choice. Without
loss of generality, we assume that this was agent 3, and that d
(3)
T (3)
= 1, d
(1)
T (3)
= d
(2)
T (3)
= 0. There is a small
probability that private information leads to a concurrent decision by multiple agents, and we describe this
case at the end of the section. The social information obtained from a decision by agent 3 may or may
not drive agent 1 or 2 to a decision. Both the presence and absence of a decision by either agent reveals
further social information to its undecided counterpart, and we assume that all undecided agents wait until
no further social information can be obtained before gathering further private information. We will see
that, akin to the equilibration process, there can be a number of decision-making rounds before evidence
accumulation continues.
There are three possible outcomes following the decision of agent 3 (See Fig. 8): If d
(3)
T (3)
= 1 and
y
(i)
T (3)
≥ 0, for i = 1, 2, then both remaining agents decide immediately, d(i)
T (3),1
= 1, and the evidence
accumulation process stops. We therefore only examine cases where (i) y
(i)
T (3)
< 0 for i = 1 or i = 2 (but not
both), and (ii) y
(i)
T (3)
< 0 for both i = 1, 2.
As in the equilibration process described previously, agents update their beliefs based on the observed
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Fig. 8. (a) In a three-agent clique all three agents make independent observations, and observe each other’s decisions.
(b) Three main possibilities follow the decision of agent 3: (b1) If the beliefs of the undecided agents are both positive, both
follow the decision of agent 3; (b2) If the decision causes only one of the remaining agents to decide (agent 2 here). This
secondary decision leads to a further update in the belief of the remaining agent equal to R−(T (3)) (agent 1 here); (b3) If
neither of the remaining agents decides, they observe each other’s indecision, and update their belief by R−(T (1)) < 0. This
update cannot lead to a decision, and both agents continue to accumulate private evidence. The dashed portion of the belief
trajectory shows the intermediate steps in social information exchange: Each agent’s belief consists of information due to its
own private observation, a jump θ > 0, followed by a jump R−(T (1)) < 0. No decision can be reached, and the two agents
continue to accumulate information, but now have further knowledge about each other’s belief. Cases in which the private
evidence leads to a simultaneous decision by two or three agents are not shown.
decision state of their counterpart until no further information can be gained from the process. Before
observing the decision of agent 3, and after the private observation at time T (3), the beliefs of agents i = 1, 2
are y
(i)
T (3),0
= Priv
(i)
1:T (3)
by Proposition 6.1. They next account for the decision d
(3)
T (3)
= 1 that reaches both
simultaneously:
y
(i)
T (3),1
= Priv
(i)
1:T (3)
+ log
P (d
(3)
T (3)
= 1, d
(3)
T (3)−1 = 0, d
(1,2)
T (3)
= 0|H+)
P (d
(3)
T (3)
= 1, d
(3)
T (3)−1 = 0, d
(1,2)
T (3)
= 0|H−)
≈ Priv(i)
1:T (3)
+ θ.(7.1)
The social information obtained from agent 3’s decision should incorporate the increment +
T (3)
discussed in
Proposition 4.1. For a clearer exposition, we assume private evidence is weak, and 0 < |±
T (3)
|  1, and we
thus use the approximation ±
T (3)
≈ 0 from here on.
Any agent who remains undecided after the update given by Eq. (7.1) will update their belief iteratively
in response to the decision information of their neighbor. We describe this process in the cases in which at
least one agent remains undecided after observing the decision of agent 3.
Case (i) - One Agent Undecided. Without loss of generality, we assume y
(2)
T,0 ≥ 0 so that d(2)T,1 = 1. After
observing the decision of agent 3, the belief of agent 1 is y
(1)
T,1 = Priv
(1)
1:T + θ. After observing the decision of
agent 2, a straightforward computation gives:
y
(1)
T (3),2
≈ Priv(1)1:T + θ + log
P (d
(2)
T (3),1
= 1|d(3)
T (3),0
= 1, H+)
P (d
(2)
T (3),1
= 1|d(3)
T (3),0
= 1, H−)
= Priv
(1)
1:T (3)
+ θ +R+(T
(3)),(7.2)
where
R+(t) := log
P (y
(2)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H+)
P (y
(2)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H−)
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since agent 2’s belief must have been non-negative before observing the decision of agent 3. We now prove
a general proposition which implies that R+(t) < θ. This proposition will be useful subsequently when
bounding social information obtained from more general intervals of one’s neighbors’ beliefs.
In what follows, we assume an agent’s belief lies in some subinterval (a, b) of Θ = (−θ, θ), and bound
the social information obtained from this knowledge, concluding it provides at most an increment of social
evidence of amplitude θ.
In the proof we assume a sequence of private observations results in a belief (LLR) that can lie exactly
on the decision threshold θ, as in the examples in the text. The proof can be extended to cases when
information gained from individual measurements is small, so that 0 < |±t |  1. The proof in this case is
equivalent, but somewhat more involved.
Proposition 7.1. Let −θ < a ≤ b < θ. If agent j has not made a decision and has accumulated only
private information by time T , then ∣∣∣∣∣log P (a ≤ y(j)T ≤ b|H+)P (a ≤ y(j)T ≤ b|H−)
∣∣∣∣∣ < θ.
Proof. Define the subset VT (a, b) ⊂ ΞT of the product space of observations ΞT consisting of observation
sequences that result in a belief contained in [a, b] at time T :
VT (a, b) = {ξ(j)1:T ∈ ΞT : Priv(j)1:t ∈ (−θ, θ), for t ≤ T, Priv(j)1:T ∈ [a, b]}.
By definition, we can write
ea ≤
T∏
t=1
f+(ξ
(j)
t )
f−(ξ
(j)
t )
≤ eb, ∀ξ1:T ∈ VT (a, b),
which can be rearranged as
ea
T∏
t=1
f−(ξ
(j)
t ) ≤
T∏
t=1
f+(ξ
(j)
t ) ≤ eb
T∏
t=1
f−(ξ
(j)
t ), ∀ξ(j)1:T ∈ VT (a, b).
Summing over all ξ
(j)
1:T ∈ VT (a, b) then yields
ea
∑
VT (a,b)
T∏
t=1
f−(ξ
(j)
t ) ≤
∑
VT (a,b)
T∏
t=1
P+(ξ
(j)
t ) ≤ eb
∑
VT (a,b)
T∏
t=1
P−(ξ
(j)
t ),
so that by noting P (y
(j)
T ∈ [a, b]|H±) =
∑
VT (a,b)
∏T
t=1 P±(ξ
(j)
t ), and rearranging we find
e−θ < ea ≤ P (y
(j)
T ∈ [a, b]|H+)
P (y
(j)
T ∈ [a, b]|H−)
≤ eb < eθ,
which implies the desired result.
Thus, as mentioned before R+(t) < θ. However, this increment in belief may be sufficient to lead to a
decision by agent 1. If not, agent 1 continues to accumulate private evidence on the next time step.
We will estimate R+(t) in arbitrarily large cliques in section 8. In particular, R+(t) may be computed
explicitly in the same way as S±(t), as shown in Eq. (6.7) and (6.8).
Case (ii): Two Agents Undecided. If y
(i)
T (3),0
< 0 for i = 1, 2, then both agents remain undecided upon
observing a decision by agent 3. After each observes this absence of a decision in its counterpart, it follows
from the computations that lead to Eq. (7.2), that each updates its belief as
(7.3) y
(i)
T (3),2
≈ Priv(i)
1:T (3)
+ θ +R−(T (3)) with R−(t) := log
P (y
(¬i)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H+)
P (y
(¬i)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H−)
.
Due to symmetry, the new social information is equal for both agents.
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Fig. 9. (a) In a three-agent clique the probability that all three agents make the correct choice is larger when social
information is exchanged. (b) The average time it takes all three agents decide is smaller when the agents communicate, since
social information pushes agents closer to threshold. Both effects are more pronounced when the SNR of private evidence is
low, i.e p/q is small. (c) As the number of agents in a clique, N , increases, the probability that all agents in the clique make the
correct choice grows. The difference is more pronounced when SNR is low. (d) Larger cliques provide more social information
reducing the average decision times. Here, |θ±| = 30, and p, q are defined as in Section 4.
Note that R−(t) ≤ 0 and also |R−|(t) < θ, as shown in Proposition 7.1. Therefore Eq. (7.3) shows that
this second belief update cannot lead to a decision, and d
(i)
T (3),2
= 0 for i = 1, 2. After this second step, both
agents, i = 1, 2, know that
−θ < y(¬i)
T (3),0
+ θ +R−(T (3)) < θ ⇒ −2θ −R−(T (3)) < y(¬i)T (3),0 < −R−(T (3)).
Since R−(T (3)) ∈ (−θ, 0], this does not reveal any additional information, and the exchange of social infor-
mation stops.
At the end of this exchange, both remaining observers know that the belief of the other is in the non-
symmetric interval, y
(¬i)
T (3),0
∈ (R−(T (3)), θ+R−(T (3))). Therefore, future non-decisions become informative,
and equilibration follows each private observation as in the case of asymmetric decision thresholds discussed
in Section 5.
Concurrent Decisions. If the first decision is made simultaneously by two agents, the remaining agent
receives independent social information from both. When the two deciding agents disagree, the social
information they provide cancels. If the two agents agree on H±, the undecided agent increases its belief by
±2θ and follows the decision of the other two.
The exchange of social information increases the probability that all three agents reach a correct decision
(Fig. 9a), and decreases the time to a decision, both of a single agent, and all agents in the clique (See
Fig. 9b). The addition of strong pulsatile increments of social information leads to many trials in which
agents’ beliefs attain values well beyond the decision thresholds ±θ, mapping to accuracy that is higher
than would be obtained by beliefs at or slightly beyond threshold. This is particularly pronounced when the
SNR of private measurements is low, and uncoupled agents’ final beliefs are not pushed much beyond their
decision thresholds. When private observations are more reliable, social information becomes less important.
In the next section, we will describe similar cascades of decisions in larger cliques. Note that as we
increase the size of the network, the increase in accuracy and decrease in decision time due to the inclusion
of social information both grow (See Fig. 9c,d). We next discuss the computations following a choice in such
larger cliques.
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8. Larger Cliques. We consider a clique of N agents who all have identical symmetric decision thresh-
olds, and measurement distributions. No social information is exchanged until one or more agents makes a
choice at time T . In what follows, we focus on the case of a single agent making the first decision. The case
in which two or more agents simultaneously make the first decision can be easily analyzed as in the three
agent clique, and it often leads to all agents deciding subsequently, so we do not discuss it further.
Without loss of generality, we assume agent 1 makes the first decision, and chooses H+. This means
y
(1)
T (1)
≥ θ, and thus every other agent, i, updates their belief to
y
(i)
T (1),1
= y
(i)
T (1),0
+ θ, i 6= 1.
As earlier, we assume that the excess information, +
T (1)
(See Proposition 4.1 for definition), provided by a
decision is negligible.
Upon observing a decision, the remaining agents stop making private observations and exchange social
information until no further social information is available. Observing d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1 leads any agent i with
belief y
(i)
T (1),0
≥ 0 to the same decision. We denote the set of these agents by A1, and call these the agreeing
agents. We will see that there can be multiple waves of agreeing agents. The agents whose beliefs satisfy
y
(i)
T (1),0
< 0 update their belief to 0 < y
(i)
T (1),1
< θ, but do not make a decision. We denote the set of these
agents by U1, and call these undecided agents.
Once agent 1 chooses H+ at time T (1), the set of decisions from the first wave of agreeing agents follows
at the social information exchange step, (T (1), 1). These decisions are conditionally independent, given the
observed decision of agent 1. Thus, each agreeing agent independently provides additional evidence for H+,
while each undecided agent provides evidence for H−. As in the case of three agents, the social information
provided by an agreeing agent is R+(T
(1)), and for a disagreeing agent is R−(T (1)) = −R+(T (1)), where
R+(T
(1)) is given in Eq. (6.7). The equality follows from our assumption of symmetry, as we now show.
Proposition 8.1. Assume agent i has not received any social information at time t, so their belief,
y
(i)
t , is based on private information. Also assume that the decision thresholds, θ± = ±θ, and measurement
distributions,f+(ξ) = f−(−ξ), are symmetric. Let
R+(t) := log
P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H+)
P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H−)
, and R−(t) := log
P (y
(i)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H+)
P (y
(i)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H−)
.
Then R−(t) = −R+(t).
Proof. Following from the argument in Proposition 7.1, we can compute
P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0,∞)|H±) =
∑
V +T
T∏
t=1
f±(ξ
(i)
t ),
where we have defined
V +T = {ξ(j)1:T ∈ ΞT : Priv(j)1:s ∈ (−θ, θ), for s ≤ t, Priv(j)1:t ∈ [0,∞)}.
By symmetry, we know that for any ξ
(i)
1:t ∈ VT (a, b)+, there exists −ξ(i)1:t ∈ VT (a, b)− where
V −T = {ξ(j)1:T ∈ ΞT : Priv(j)1:s ∈ (−θ, θ), for s ≤ t, Priv(j)1:t ∈ (−∞, 0]},
and vice versa. Therefore we can write
P (y
(i)
t ∈ (−∞, 0]|H±) =
∑
V −T
T∏
t=1
f±(ξ
(i)
t ) =
∑
V +T
T∏
t=1
f±(−ξ(i)t ) =
∑
V +T
T∏
t=1
f∓(ξ
(i)
t ) = P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0,∞)|H∓),
where the penultimate equality holds since f+(ξ) = f−(−ξ). Therefore,
R−(t) = log
P (y
(i)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H+)
P (y
(i)
t ∈ (−θ, 0]|H−)
= log
P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H−)
P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H+)
= − log P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H+)
P (y
(i)
t ∈ [0, θ)|H−)
= −R+(t).
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Note that N = a1 + u1 + 1, where a1 and u1 are the number of agreeing and undecided agents in the
first wave following the decision of agent 1 at time T (1). We can explicitly compute how all u1 remaining
undecided agents update their belief.
To do so, let A1 denote the set of agreeing agents and U1 denote the set of undecided agents after the
initial decision. We want to know what an undecided agent j ∈ U1 (so d(j)T (1),1 = 0) learns by observing the
distribution of A1 and U1. To compute the evidence update for agent j first note that,
P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1, d
(i)
T (1),1
, d
(k)
T (1),1
|H) = P (d(i)
T (1),1
, d
(k)
T (1),1
|d(1)
T (1),0
= 1, H)P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1|H)
= P (d
(i)
T (1),1
|d(1)
T (1),0
= 1, H)P (d
(k)
T (1),1
|d(1)
T (1),0
= 1, H)P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1|H).
for any pair of agents i 6= j different from 1. Therefore,
y
(j)
T (1),1
= y
(j)
T (1),0
+ log
P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1|H+)
P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1|H−)
.
After observing this first wave of decision, all remaining undecided agents update their belief as,
y
(j)
T (1),2
= y
(j)
T (1)
+ log
P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1|H+)
P (d
(1)
T (1),0
= 1|H−)
+
∑
i∈A1
log
P (d
(i)
T (1),1
= 1|d(1)
T (1),0
= 1, H+)
P (d
(i)
T (1),1
= 1|d(1)
T (1)
= 1, H−)
+
∑
k∈U1−{j}
log
P (d
(k)
T (1),1
= 0|d(1)
T (1),0
= 1, H+)
P (d
(k)
T (1),1
= 0|d(1)
T (1),0
= 1, H−)
.
By conditional independence, this simplifies to:
y
(j)
T (1),2
= y
(j)
T (1),0
+ θ + a1 log
P (0 ≤ y(i)
T (1),0
< θ|H+)
P (0 ≤ y(i)
T (1),0
< θ|H−)
+ (u1 − 1) log
P (−θ < y(k)
T (1),0
< 0|H+)
P (−θ < y(k)
T (1),0
< 0|H−)
= y
(j)
T (1),0
+ θ + a1R+ + (u1 − 1)R−,
where R± are defined as in Eqs. 7.3 and 6.7 . By symmetry, R−(T (1)) = −R+(T (1)). Thus, all undecided
agents update their belief as
(8.1) y
(j)
T,2 = y
(j)
T,0 + θ + (a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1)), j ∈ U1.
Note, each undecided agent observes all agreeing agents, a1, and all undecided agents but itself.
We will see that rounds of social evidence exchange can follow. Let
R
(
t, (a, b)
)
:= log
(P (y(j)t ∈ (a, b)|H+)
P (y
(j)
t ∈ (a, b)|H−)
)
.
Note that |R(t, (a, b))| ≤ θ by Proposition 7.1, and that R(t, [0, θ)) = R+(t), R(t, (−θ, 0]) = R−(t).
Each remaining undecided agent has now observed the decision of the a1 agreeing agents, and the in-
decision of the other u1 − 1 undecided agents besides itself. Eq. (8.1) implies several possibilities for what
these agents do next:
1. If the number of agreeing agents, a1, exceeds the number of undecided agents, u1, by a sufficient
amount, (a1−(u1−1))R+(T (1)) ≥ 2θ, then all the remaining undecided agents, j ∈ U1, go along with
the decision of the first agent, and choose H+. Thus the second wave of agreeing agents encompasses
the remainder of the network.
2. If the number of undecided agents, u1, exceeds the number of agreeing agents, a1, by a sufficient
amount, (a1−(u1−1))R+(T (1)) ≤ −2θ, then all undecided agents update their belief to y(j)T (1),2 ≤ −θ,
j ∈ U1. This is a somewhat counterintuitive situation: If sufficiently many agents remain undecided
after observing the first agents’ choice, then, after observing each other’s absence of a decision, they
all agree on the opposite. Thus a wave of agreement is followed by a larger wave of disagreement.
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3. If −2θ < (a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1)) < −θ, then some of the remaining agents may disagree with the
original decision and choose H−, while others may remain undecided. We call the set of disagreeing
(contrary) agents C2, and the set of still undecided agents U2, and denote the sizes of these sets by
c2, and u2 respectively. Note that U1 = C2 ∪ U2.
The agents in U2 know that y
(j)
T (1),0
∈ (−θ, ((u1 − 1) − a1)R+(T (1)) − 2θ] for all j ∈ C2, and
y
(j)
T (1),0
∈ (((u1 − 1) − a1)R+(T (1)) − 2θ, 0) for all j ∈ U2. All agents in U2 thus update their belief
again to
y
(j)
T (1),2
= y
(j)
T (1),0
+ θ + a1R+(T
(1)) + (u2 − 1)R
(
T (1), (((u1 − 1)− a1)R+(T (1))− 2θ, 0)
)
+ c2R
(
T (1), (−θ, ((u1 − 1)− a1)R+(T (1))− 2θ)
)
.
(8.2)
This update includes the social information obtained from the initial observation, θ, and from the
agreeing agents in the first round, a1R+(T
(1)). The last two summands in Eq. (8.2) give a refinement
of the social information from the originally undecided agents in U1.
As a result of this second update some undecided agents in U2 can make a choice. If so, the
process repeats, until no undecided agents are left, or no decisions occur after an update. This
process thus must terminate after a finite number of steps. This is akin to the equilibration of
social information described earlier, but involves observed choices and occurs across the network.
Importantly, the process is realization dependent, as it depends on the private evidence accumulated
by the undecided agents. After the process is complete, symmetry is broken, and social information
equilibration occurs after each further private measurement.
4. If −θ ≤ (a1− (u1− 1))R+(T (1)) ≤ 0, then no agents in U1 make a decision, and no undecided agent
obtains any further social information. They thus continue to gather private information. Symmetry
is broken as they know that y
(j)
T (1),0
∈ (−θ, 0] for all remaining agents, j ∈ U1.
5. If 0 < (a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1)) < θ, some undecided agents may choose H+, and some may remain
undecided. We call the first set A2 and the second U2, and denote the sets’ cardinality by a2 and
u2, respectively. In this case, U1 = A2 ∪ U2. All undecided agents j ∈ U2 know that y(j)T (1),0 ∈
[−(a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1)), 0) for all j ∈ A2, and y(j)T (1),0 ∈ (−θ,−(a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1))) for all
j ∈ U2. They thus update their belief to
y
(j)
T (1),2
= y
(j)
T,0 + θ + a1R+(T
(1)) + (u2 − 1)R
(
T (1), (−θ,−(a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1)))
)
+ a2R
(
T (1), [−(a1 − (u1 − 1))R+(T (1)), 0)
)
.
(8.3)
As a result of this update, some agents may make a choice. If so, the process continues as discussed
in 3.
To summarize, before any agent in a clique makes a decision, each agent accumulates private evidence
independently. A given agent will make the first decision, say H+. All other agents with positive evidence
will follow this choice in a first wave of agreement. Undecided agents modify their evidence according to
Eq. (8.1). How many agents agree an, disagree cn, or remain undecided un in exchange n depends on the
numbers of agreeing, disagreeing, and undecided agents from previous steps: a1:n−1, c1:n−1, and u1:n−1.
Large System Size Limit. Let αN be the probability that the first agent to decide in an N -agent
clique makes the correct decision. We conjecture that as the clique size N → ∞, the probability that the
majority of the agents make the correct decision goes to 1; furthermore, all agents will make the correct
decision with probability αN . An asymptotic argument for this result in the special case of a biased random
walk on an integer lattice is straightforward. However, a detailed proof of the general claim would be lengthy,
so we save a thorough treatment of this problem for future work.
In Fig. 10 we plot information about the behavior of cliques of various sizes, hinting at trends that
emerge as N →∞. We assume the correct state is H+. As the size of the clique grows, so does the amount
of information available to undecided agents after the first wave of decisions, i.e. the members of the set U1
(See Fig. 10b). As clique size grows, the first decision occurs earlier (Figs. 10c-d). In particular, as N grows,
the first decision time approaches θ/ log(p/q)–the minimum number of steps required to make a decision.
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Fig. 10. (a) In a clique of size N , we assume agent 1 makes a decision which is observed by all other agents. Agents
whose beliefs are positive (agreeing agents), follow the decision of this initial agent. The remaining undecided agents continue
to exchange social information. (b) Average social information, E[(a1 − (u1 − 1))R+], available to undecided agents after
observing the first wave of agreeing agents as a function of the first decision time for different clique sizes. (c) The probability
that the majority of the group has positive belief as a function of the first decision time for different clique sizes. This is
equivalent to the probability that the majority of the clique consists of agreeing agents when the first decision occurs. (d)
The probability that no agent has made a decision as a function of decision time for different clique sizes. Here, |θ±| = 20,
p = e/10, and q = 1/10. (e) The fraction of agents choosing correctly after the first wave following a decision (solid) and after
equilibration (dashed) as a function of clique size for various values of p/q and θ.
Moreover, most agents accrue evidence in favor of the correct decision at an earlier time. By the time the
first decision occurs, the majority of the clique will be inclined toward the correct decision. The ensuing first
decision, if it is correct, will immediately cause the majority of the clique to choose correctly. However, note
that as clique size grows, the probability that the initial decision is incorrect also grows. It is therefore not
obvious that the asymptotic fraction of the clique that chooses correctly approaches 1: If the initial decision
is incorrect, the majority of the clique will be undecided after incorporating social information from the
initial decision (See Fig. 10c). However, the social information exchange described above can still lead the
remainder of the clique to overcome the impact of the wrong initial decision. Numerical simulations suggest
that the the fraction of the clique that makes the correct choice does limit to 1, at least in the cases we have
examined.
9. Discussion. There has been extensive work on the mathematics of evidence accumulation by indi-
vidual agents [7,9,47,59,62]. The resulting models have been very successful in explaining experimental data
and the dynamics of decision making [25, 58]. In parallel, economists have developed mathematical models
of networks of rational decision makers [26, 39]. However, in the work of economists static models are the
norm, and the temporal dynamics of decisions are not studied explicitly. In contrast, temporal dynamics
have been extensively studied in the psychology literature, but predominantly in the case of subjects making
decisions based on private evidence [33] (although see [3, 27, 30]). Here, we provide a bridge between these
research areas by developing a normative models of evidence accumulation in social networks.
The beliefs of evidence-accumulators in a network have been modeled by diffusively coupled drift-diffusion
equations [45, 54]. Such models approximate continuous information-sharing between agents [54], and have
lead to a number of interesting insights. However, it is not always clear when linear coupling between
neighbors approximates the normative process of evidence accumulation and exchange between rational
agents. In a related model, an agent observing a choice was assumed to experience a jump in its belief [10].
This study examined how the size of this jump affects the decisions of the collective. While not normative,
this model displays interesting dynamics, and provides insight into decision making when agents over- or
under-weight available evidence [6].
The belief dynamics of agents in our normative model differs from past accounts in several respects.
First, we assume agents only communicate decision information, and do so normatively. In this case, coupling
between agents is nonlinear and depends on a threshold-crossing process. We have shown that agents can
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exchange social evidence even in the absence of a decision when their measurement distributions or decision
thresholds are not symmetric. Observing the decision state of a neighbor may result in further exchanges
of social information with other neighbors. Furthermore, agents that do not have a direct view of all other
agents in the network must marginalize over all possible decision states of the unobserved nodes. This can
lead to complex computations, in contrast to the model discussed in [29], where a central agent sees all
actions and optimizes a final decision assuming all other agents accumulate evidence independently.
The absence of choice is informative only in the case of asymmetries. This could be due to one choice
being more rewarding than another [28, 40, 60]. For instance, the random dot motion task, which requires
subjects to determine the dominant direction of randomly moving dots, has been extensively used in psy-
chophysical and neurobiological studies. In this task subjects set their decision thresholds symmetrically
when the reward and frequency of each choice is symmetric [25, 52]. However, when one drift direction is
more likely or rewarded more, subjects exhibit accuracy and response time biases consistent with an asym-
metric prior or thresholds [28, 40]. Recordings suggest neural activity representing decisions is dynamically
modulated during the evidence accumulation process to reflect this bias [28, 44]. This is notably different
from the static offsets apparent in the Bayesian model, but further investigation is needed to determine how
priors are represented across the entire decision-making system [56].
In our model, unless threshold asymmetries are large, the social information communicated by the
indecision of a single agent is weak. However, in large social networks the totality of such evidence provided
by all other agents can be large compared to the private information obtained by an agent. Therefore,
in large networks even small asymmetries can produce social information from indecisions that strongly
influences decisions: Consider a new, desirable product that hits the market. If a large fraction of a social
network is indecisive about purchasing the product, this can communicate potential issues with the product.
This signal could be particularly strong if the product is particularly desirable upon its release. Another
example is the case of decentralized detection: Consider a distributed network of independent environmental
hazard sensors which only communicate their decision (e.g., whether the environment is hazardous or safe)
to a central agent (fusion center), which combines their independent decisions [11]. The central agent only
uses social information, but has a much more accurate estimate of the environmental state than any single
sensor. Moreover, if decision thresholds are set asymmetrically, say so that the hazard threshold is much
lower, the presence of indecisions in all sensors would suggest they are collecting evidence in favor of a safe
environment. By computing the LLR of the survival probability from each independent sensor, the central
agent could obtain strong evidence suggesting a safe environment even before receiving any decisions.
Our models assume all agents implement the same decision thresholds θ± and that they all know this.
This assumption can be relaxed in different ways: Agents could use different decision thresholds θ1:N± , which
may, or may not, be known to the other agents in the network. When thresholds are known, much of our
analysis carries over, with agents updating their belief in response to observing a decision state depending
on who they observe. This increases the notational complexity, but the opinion exchange dynamics remain
largely the same. When thresholds are not known, agents can also update their belief about, i.e. the posterior
over, the possible decision thresholds of their neighbors over multiple decisions. Indeed, finding out which of
your friends are rash to make decisions, and which ones tend to be cautious is essential to properly weighing
their opinions. However, this requires observations and interactions over multiple decisions, something we do
not consider here. In addition, there is evidence that humans tend to treat others as if they make decisions in
similar ways [3]. How humans learn each other’s decision thresholds, and how such learning impacts decision
making has not been extensively explored, and are fruitful avenues for future work.
Our normative model is unlikely to accurately describe the decision making process of biological agents.
The rationality of humans and other animals is bounded [53], while some of the computations that we have
described are quite complex, and provide only marginal increases in the probability of making a correct
choice. Thus biological agents are likely to perform only those computations – perhaps approximately – that
provide the largest impact [13]. A normative model allows us to identify which computations are important,
and which offer only fractional benefits.
Our analysis relied on the assumption that private observations received by the individual agents are
independent. When this is not the case agents need to account for correlations between private observations
in determining the value of social information. In general, we expect that an increased redundancy of
neighboring agents’ observations reduces the impact of social information. Similarly, correlated private
observations across time will lead to smaller increments in the LLR. However, experimental evidence suggests
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that humans do not take into account such correlations when making decisions [18,32], and behave as if the
evidence gathered by different members of their social group is independent of their own. The types of
models we describe may approximate the decision-making process of agents that make such assumptions and
the impact of ignoring such correlations when they are present is an interesting avenue for future work [55].
Our assumption that all agents in the network are identical can be relaxed. As long as all agents know each
other’s measurement distributions and decision thresholds, social information can be computed as we have
done in the present work, although notation becomes more cumbersome. The case in which agents do not
know their neighbors’ measurement distributions and thresholds is considerably more complex. In this case
agents either marginalize over the unknown parameters of their neighbors, or try to infer them based on the
temporal dynamics of their decision states.
Our findings are distinct, but related to previous work on herding and common knowledge. In this
modeling work agents typically make a single private measurement, followed by an exchange, or propagation
of social information [5, 34]. In recurrent networks, agents can announce their preference for a choice, until
they reach agreement with their neighbors [2, 23, 24, 37]. This framework can be simplified so that agents
make binary decisions, based solely on their neighbors’ opinion, admitting asymptotic analyses of the cascade
of decisions through networks with complex structure [63]. In contrast, we assume that agents accumulate
private and social evidence, and make irrevocable decisions. The resulting decision-making processes are
considerably different: For instance, in our model agents, and there is no guarantee that social learning
occurs. Combining private and social evidence also makes it difficult to derive exact results, but we expect
asymptotic formulas are possible for large cliques, and simpler assumptions on the decision process.
Key to understanding the collective behavior of social organisms is uncovering how they gather and
exchange information to make decisions [13, 21]. Mathematical models allow us to quantify how different
evidence-accumulation strategies impact experimentally observable characteristics of the decision-making
process such as the speed and accuracy of choices [8], and the level of agreement among members of a
collective [12]. Such models can thus lead the way towards understanding the decisions and disagreements
that emerge in social groups.
Acknowledgements. This work was supported by an NSF/NIH CRCNS grant (R01MH115557) and
an NSF grant (DMS-1517629). BK and KJ were supported by NSF grant (DMS-1662305). KJ was also
supported by NSF NeuroNex grant (DBI-1707400). ZPK was also supported by an NSF grant (DMS-
1615737).
REFERENCES
[1] D. Acemoglu, M. A. Dahleh, I. Lobel, and A. Ozdaglar, Bayesian learning in social networks, The Review of
Economic Studies, 78 (2011), pp. 1201–1236.
[2] R. J. Aumann, Agreeing to disagree, The annals of statistics, (1976), pp. 1236–1239.
[3] B. Bahrami, K. Olsen, P. E. Latham, A. Roepstorff, G. Rees, and C. D. Frith, Optimally interacting minds,
Science, 329 (2010), pp. 1081–1085.
[4] F. Balci, P. Simen, R. Niyogi, A. Saxe, J. A. Hughes, P. Holmes, and J. D. Cohen, Acquisition of decision making
criteria: reward rate ultimately beats accuracy, Atten. Percept. Psychophys., 73 (2011), pp. 640–657.
[5] A. V. Banerjee, A simple model of herd behavior, Q. J. Econ., (1992), pp. 797–817.
[6] J. M. Beck, W. J. Ma, X. Pitkow, P. E. Latham, and A. Pouget, Not noisy, just wrong: the role of suboptimal
inference in behavioral variability, Neuron, 74 (2012), pp. 30–39.
[7] R. Bogacz, E. Brown, J. Moehlis, P. Holmes, and J. D. Cohen, The physics of optimal decision making: A formal
analysis of models of performance in two-alternative forced-choice tasks., Psychological Review, 113 (2006), pp. 700–
765.
[8] R. Bogacz, E.-J. Wagenmakers, B. U. Forstmann, and S. Nieuwenhuis, The neural basis of the speed–accuracy
tradeoff, Trends in neurosciences, 33 (2010), pp. 10–16.
[9] J. R. Busemeyer and J. T. Townsend, Decision field theory: A dynamic-cognitive approach to decision making in an
uncertain environment., Psychological review, 100 (1993), p. 432.
[10] R. J. Caginalp and B. Doiron, Decision dynamics in groups with interacting members, SIAM Journal on Applied
Dynamical Systems, 16 (2017), pp. 1543–1562.
[11] J.-F. Chamberland and V. V. Veeravalli, Decentralized detection in sensor networks, IEEE Transactions on Signal
Processing, 51 (2003), pp. 407–416.
[12] L. Conradt and T. J. Roper, Consensus decision making in animals, Trends in ecology & evolution, 20 (2005), pp. 449–
456.
[13] I. D. Couzin, Collective cognition in animal groups, Trends in cognitive sciences, 13 (2009), pp. 36–43.
[14] I. D. Couzin, J. Krause, N. R. Franks, and S. A. Levin, Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups
on the move, Nature, 433 (2005), pp. 513–516.
29
[15] , Effective leadership and decision-making in animal groups on the move., Nature, 433 (2005), pp. 513–516.
[16] M. H. DeGroot, Optimal statistical decisions, vol. 82, John Wiley & Sons, 2005.
[17] W. Edwards, The theory of decision making, (1954), pp. 380–417.
[18] B. Enke and F. Zimmermann, Correlation neglect in belief formation, CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4483, (2013).
[19] R. Fagin, J. Y. Halpern, Y. Moses, and M. Vardi, Reasoning about knowledge, MIT press, 2004.
[20] N. R. Franks and T. Richardson, Teaching in tandem-running ants, Nature, 439 (2006), pp. 153–153.
[21] C. D. Frith and U. Frith, Mechanisms of social cognition, Annual review of psychology, 63 (2012), pp. 287–313.
[22] D. Gale and S. Kariv, Bayesian learning in social networks, Games and Economic Behavior, 45 (2003), pp. 329–346.
[23] J. Geanakoplos, Common knowledge, Handbook of game theory with economic applications, 2 (1994), pp. 1437–1496.
[24] J. D. Geanakoplos and H. M. Polemarchakis, We can’t disagree forever, Journal of Economic Theory, 28 (1982),
pp. 192–200.
[25] J. I. Gold and M. N. Shadlen, The neural basis of decision making, Annu. Rev. Neurosci., 30 (2007), pp. 535–574.
[26] S. b. Goyal, Connections: An introduction to the economics of networks, 2012.
[27] S. P. Haller, D. Bang, B. Bahrami, and J. Y. Lau, Group decision-making is optimal in adolescence. bioRxiv 412726,
2018.
[28] T. D. Hanks, M. E. Mazurek, R. Kiani, E. Hopp, and M. N. Shadlen, Elapsed decision time affects the weighting of
prior probability in a perceptual decision task, Journal of Neuroscience, 31 (2011), pp. 6339–6352.
[29] M. Kimura and J. Moehlis, Group decision-making models for sequential tasks, SIAM Review, 54 (2012), pp. 121–138.
[30] I. Krajbich, T. Hare, B. Bartling, Y. Morishima, and E. Fehr, A Common Mechanism Underlying Food Choice and
Social Decisions., PLoS Computational Biology, 11 (2015), p. e1004371.
[31] D. Lazer, A. S. Pentland, L. Adamic, S. Aral, A. L. Barabasi, D. Brewer, N. Christakis, N. Contractor,
J. Fowler, M. Gutmann, et al., Life in the network: the coming age of computational social science, Science (New
York, NY), 323 (2009), p. 721.
[32] G. Levy and R. Razin, Correlation neglect, voting behavior, and information aggregation, The American Economic
Review, 105 (2015), pp. 1634–1645.
[33] R. D. Luce, Response times: Their role in inferring elementary mental organization, no. 8, Oxford University Press on
Demand, 1986.
[34] P. Milgrom and N. Stokey, Information, trade and common knowledge, Journal of economic theory, 26 (1982), pp. 17–
27.
[35] N. Miller, S. Garnier, A. T. Hartnett, and I. D. Couzin, Both information and social cohesion determine collective
decisions in animal groups, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 110 (2013), pp. 5263–5268.
[36] E. Mossel, A. Sly, and O. Tamuz, Asymptotic learning on bayesian social networks, Probab. Theory Related Fields,
158 (2014), pp. 127–157.
[37] E. Mossel and O. Tamuz, Opinion exchange dynamics, arXiv preprint arXiv:1401.4770, (2014).
[38] M. Moussa¨ıd, N. Perozo, S. Garnier, D. Helbing, and G. Theraulaz, The walking behaviour of pedestrian social
groups and its impact on crowd dynamics, PloS one, 5 (2010), p. e10047.
[39] M. Mueller-Frank, A general framework for rational learning in social networks, Theoretical Economics, 8 (2013),
pp. 1–40.
[40] M. J. Mulder, E.-J. Wagenmakers, R. Ratcliff, W. Boekel, and B. U. Forstmann, Bias in the brain: a diffusion
model analysis of prior probability and potential payoff, Journal of Neuroscience, 32 (2012), pp. 2335–2343.
[41] M. Nagy, Z. Akos, D. Biro, and T. Vicsek, Hierarchical group dynamics in pigeon flocks, Nature, 464 (2010), pp. 890–
893.
[42] M. E. Newman, The structure and function of complex networks, SIAM review, 45 (2003), pp. 167–256.
[43] S. A. Park, S. Go¨ıame, D. A. O’Connor, and J. Dreher, Integration of individual and social information for decision-
making in groups of different sizes, PLoS Biology, 15 (2017), p. e2001958.
[44] M. L. Platt and P. W. Glimcher, Neural correlates of decision variables in parietal cortex, Nature, 400 (1999), p. 233.
[45] I. Poulakakis, L. Scardovi, and N. E. Leonard, Node classification in networks of stochastic evidence accumulators,
arXiv preprint arXiv:1210.4235, (2012).
[46] R. M. Raafat, N. Chater, and C. Frith, Herding in humans, Trends in cognitive sciences, 13 (2009), pp. 420–428.
[47] A. E. Radillo, A. Veliz-Cuba, K. Josic´, and Z. P. Kilpatrick, Evidence accumulation and change rate inference in
dynamic environments, Neural Computation, 29 (2017), pp. 1561–1610.
[48] R. Ratcliff and G. McKoon, The diffusion decision model: theory and data for two-choice decision tasks, Neural
computation, 20 (2008), pp. 873–922.
[49] R. Ratcliff and J. N. Rouder, Modeling Response Times for Two-Choice Decisions, Psychological science, 9 (1998),
pp. 347–356.
[50] T. Saaty, How to make a decision: The analytic hierarchy process, European J. Oper. Res., (1990), pp. 9–26.
[51] T. D. Seeley, S. Camazine, and J. Sneyd, Collective decision-making in honey bees: how colonies choose among nectar
sources, Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 28 (1991), pp. 277–290.
[52] M. N. Shadlen and W. T. Newsome, Motion perception: seeing and deciding, Proceedings of the national academy of
sciences, 93 (1996), pp. 628–633.
[53] H. A. Simon, Bounded rationality, in Utility and probability, Springer, 1990, pp. 15–18.
[54] V. Srivastava and N. E. Leonard, Collective decision-making in ideal networks: The speed-accuracy tradeoff, IEEE
Transactions on Control of Network Systems, 1 (2014), pp. 121–132.
[55] S. Stolarczyk, M. Bhardwaj, K. E. Bassler, W. J. Ma, and K. Josic´, Loss of information in feedforward social
networks, Journal of Complex Networks, 6 (2017), pp. 448–469.
[56] C. Summerfield and F. P. De Lange, Expectation in perceptual decision making: neural and computational mechanisms,
Nature Reviews Neuroscience, 15 (2014), p. 745.
[57] H. M. Taylor and S. Karlin, An introduction to stochastic modeling, Academic press, 2014.
30
[58] M. Usher and J. L. McClelland, The time course of perceptual choice: the leaky, competing accumulator model.,
Psychological review, 108 (2001), p. 550.
[59] A. Veliz-Cuba, Z. P. Kilpatrick, and K. Josic´, Stochastic models of evidence accumulation in changing environments,
SIAM Review, 58 (2016), pp. 264–289.
[60] A. Voss, K. Rothermund, and J. Voss, Interpreting the parameters of the diffusion model: An empirical validation,
Memory & Cognition, 32 (2004), pp. 1206–1220.
[61] A. Wald, Sequential tests of statistical hypotheses, The annals of mathematical statistics, 16 (1945), pp. 117–186.
[62] A. Wald and J. Wolfowitz, Optimum character of the sequential probability ratio test, The Annals of Mathematical
Statistics, (1948), pp. 326–339.
[63] D. J. Watts, A simple model of global cascades on random networks, Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences,
99 (2002), pp. 5766–5771.
[64] G. Yan, T. Zhou, B. Hu, Z.-Q. Fu, and B.-H. Wang, Efficient routing on complex networks, Physical Review E, 73
(2006), p. 046108.
31
